



Latino Identities in Context: Ethnic Cues, Immigration, and the Politics of Shared Ethnicity

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Ethnic Cues, Immigration, and the Politics of Shared Ethnicity

Abstract

This dissertation is a collection of three essays examining the relationship between immigrant political rhetoric and identity among Latinos in the United States. To achieve this task, this study uses empirical evidence from a national survey and original data collected from experiments in New York City and Los Angeles. The first essay identifies three forms of Latino identity most relevant to political decision-making: national origin, pan-ethnic, and American. I find that levels of acculturation as defined by immigrant status and English language strongly predict American identification. Latino identities inform support on immigrant issues. Latinos with higher perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic interests are more pro-immigrant on issues pertaining to the rights of undocumented immigrants.

The second essay investigates how exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-immigrant rhetoric shape the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups in New York City. I test the effects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical political appeals on candidate support. I find that nationality-based appeals directly or indirectly targeting Mexican immigrants do not activate identity in vote choice, only explicit, pan-ethnic cues implicating all Latino immigrants activate “Latino” group interests in voting decisions.

The third essay tests whether political processes of collective identity observed among non-Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Mexican and non-Mexicans in Border States. Conversely, I find that only nationality-based political appeals targeting Mexicans activate Mexican group interests in vote choice. These results do not extend to non-Mexicans. Anti-immigrant messages did not activate identity in voting. Overall, these findings suggest that identity activation in the context of threat may work differently for Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in the United States.

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Glossary of Terms

Panethnicity: Jose Itzigsohn and Carlos Dore-Cabral (2000) provide the following definition of panethnicity: “The expansion of ethnic group boundaries to include different national or ethnic groups that share a common language, a common culture, or a common regional origin into an encompassing identity.”

National Origin: The U.S. Census defines national origin as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person’s parents or ancestors.

Explicit Political Appeals: Anti-immigrant political rhetoric that use words such as “Latino” or “Hispanic” to express negative sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from Latinos.

Implicit Political Appeals: Anti-immigrant rhetoric that express negative sentiments, makes stereotypical or derogatory statements, or portrays a threat using more subtle references to Latinos/Hispanics without using collective terms such Latino or Hispanic. For example, phrases such as low-skilled immigrants are often used to define Latinos implicitly (Valentino et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010).

Pan-ethnic Political Appeals: These type of political appeals use words such as “Latino” or “Hispanic” to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the collective group.

Nationality-Based Political Appeals: These appeals focus on the interests of a particular national origin group to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the respective group.

Counter-Stereotypical Political Appeals: Such appeals express anti-immigrant sentiments on a nationality-group less frequently stigmatized in American immigration debates such as European or Canadian immigrants.

Introduction

The 2000 United States Census declared Latinos as the largest racial and ethnic minority group in the United States. While questions still loom among academics and political pundits as to whether such growth will lead to substantive political incorporation, we have observed several examples in the past two decades of increased Latino political mobilization. Consider California's electoral landscape between 1994 and 1998 with the enactment of Propositions 187 and 227. The campaign targeted undocumented immigrants by denying access to state services and ending bilingual education programs (Nicholson 2005). While these initiatives were pivotal in the re-election of California Governor Pete Wilson, they also increased Latino voter participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Barreto and Woods 2005; Nicholson, Bowler, and Segura 2006). Recall the series of immigration marches across U.S. cities in the spring of 2006. In the course of four months, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protested in the streets of over 160 U.S. cities against House Bill 4437, increasing penalties for undocumented immigrants (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and Rim 2009). Again, in May of 2010, tens of thousands demonstrators chanted "shame, shame, Arizona," carrying signs of "Todos somos Arizona" in protest against Arizona's toughest immigration law, SB 1070 (Preston, *New York Times*, May 1, 2010).

Early models of political participation emphasize resource-based explanations, such as income and education, to explain why individuals are motivated to act while others are not (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). However, the unprecedented waves of Latino protests in 2006 and 2010 challenge theoretical understandings of political mobilization among underrepresented racial and ethnic groups. Despite low levels of income and education, young-age, and high levels of non-citizenship, mass protests took place in U.S. cities, making links between immigration and political activism, even among those with few resources, a highly salient issue on the nation's agenda.

The experiences of Latinos in the United States provide an excellent case of how inter-

nal and external forces within and outside immigrant-based communities shape processes of political incorporation. Of central importance in this dissertation is the salience of shared ethnicity. While there is considerable disagreement as to whether ethnicity shapes Latino political behavior, three patterns, often conflicting, emerge within these debates (Garcia and Arce 1988). First, patterns of social and political exclusion experienced by Latinos suggest that ethnicity is and will continue to evolve as a central determinant in Latino political behavior (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; López and Stanton-Salazar 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Mollenkopf et al. 2006; Jiménez 2009, 2010). Second, and highly contested, is the possibility that the political salience of ethnicity can disappear across generations and over time (Alba 1990; Dahl 1961). Models of European incorporation at the turn of the twentieth century suggest that the salience of race and ethnicity declines with the birth of each generation (Higham [1955] 1963; Roediger 1991; 2005; Jacobson 1998). Lastly, differences in national origin may challenge opportunities for collective mobilization. Heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups as well as differences in residential patterns - Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the Northeast, Cubans in the South Florida, and Mexicans in the West and Southwest - divides the Latino social experience, contributing to distinct political differences (DeSipio 1996, Segura and Rodrigues 2006).

This dissertation engages with each of these debates by investigating how Latinos across different national origin groups and levels of acculturation negotiate competing national origin, pan-ethnic, or American group identities and how these identities inform political decision-making. In particular, I focus on three important research questions. One, how do Latinos conceptualize their group and to what extent do national origin, pan-ethnic, or American group attachments shape evaluations of immigrant issues? Two, does exposure to explicit or implicit cues within anti-immigrant political rhetoric increase or decrease the salience of ethnic group considerations in Latino vote choice? Three, do anti-immigrant political messages resonate differently for Mexicans versus non-Mexican Latino groups?

Defining the Group

To understand processes of collective identity formation within Latino communities and how they function in the political world, it is first important to define exactly what is meant by terms *Latino* and *collective identity*. Many scholars and political activists reject the word *Latino* since it neglects important historical, demographic, and cultural differences that exist across different groups of Latino national origin (Oboler 1995). Similar to Bedolla (2005), I use *Latino* and *Hispanic* interchangeably to denote a socially constructed group in the United States mainly defined by immigrants and their descendants from Latin America. Latino is an ethnic category in the United States that encompasses individuals across different Latin American heritages and cultures. Many can be of European, African, Asian, indigenous, or of mixed race descent. Given such racial and ethnic heterogeneity, Latinos have many options in how they identify and mobilize as a group (Masuoka 2008).

This dissertation emphasizes the ways in which Latinos are motivated to act or not on behalf of the “collective.” This does not assume that individuals possess only one form of identity, but rather various forms of identity such as race, ethnicity, class, or gender can become salient depending upon context. More specifically, I define collective identities as “shifting, situational, contextually driven understandings of self and place in particular historical moments” (Bedolla 2005, 7; See Padilla 1985). In decisions to mobilize, some identities may become more salient than others. I argue that the political environment can determine when and how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize collectively as “Latinos” or as members within their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985). This research study identifies the political conditions under which pan-ethnic versus national origin identities become relevant in short-term political decision-making among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. In particular, I focus on the relationship between perceptions of collective identity and Immigrant political rhetoric. Variation in the strength of collective identity can play an important role in how Latinos across different national origin groups and generations

evaluate debates about immigration politics. Moreover, discourse from political elites about immigration can play an important role in whether pan-ethnic or national origin identities are activated in decisions to support a candidate.

Immigrant Political Rhetoric and Latino Identities

Three critical arguments frame this dissertation. First, I identify three forms of identity that shape Latino socialization in the United States: national origin, pan-ethnic, and American. While social scientists argue that patterns of exclusion and racialization may increase the salience of ethnicity, I posit that levels of acculturation as well as national origin can strongly predict the strength of identification and consciousness along these three dimensions. I also argue that these patterns of self-identification and levels of acculturation - as defined by immigrant status or English proficiency - have important implications for how Latinos engage the political world. In particular, the ways in which Latinos define themselves will shape how they view their group's interests in regard to national immigration debates.

Second, I argue that elite discourse about immigration and/or immigrants in political media influences the type of cleavages formed among diverse groups of Latinos. Differences in group attachments across Latino national origin groups within particular geographies may promote or minimize collective understandings of political interests in regard to immigrant-related debates. Of central concern are differences in group salience among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. Previous research focuses exclusively on the politics of Mexican Americans, leaving unresolved questions about how identity is activated among non-Mexicans in immigration debates. Much of this debates revolves around the interests of Mexicans in the United States. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants in elite immigration discourse, I posit that ethnic cues about Mexican immigration may not be effective in mobilizing collective identity interests in the voting decisions of non-Mexican groups. For group-mobilization to occur, non-Mexican groups must perceive a sense of soli-

clarity and unity within their own economic and political experiences. Elite framing is critical to the mobilization of collective identities. These frames effectively identify the “injustice” or benefit of a policy or position to a particular social group (Polleta and Jasper 2001, 291). To the extent to which anti-immigrant political messages focus on the interests of a particular national origin group, non-Mexican groups may not rely upon collective identities in defining their political preferences (Richeson and Craig 2011; see also White 2007). Thus, these types of ethnic cues within immigration debates have the potential to disrupt group-based politics. In sum, anti-immigrant rhetoric explicitly targeting Latinos collectively activates Latino group interests in decisions not to support a candidate.

Third, pan-ethnic group interests may not be particularly accessible where a national origin group is sufficient in numbers to mobilize effectively on its own. This is particularly the case for Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans residing in Border States. Because of ongoing immigration from Mexico coupled with shared experiences of exclusion in a political context that often stigmatizes those of Mexican origin Mexican identity is highly salient. Based on these experiences, I argue that nationality-based cues in which Mexicans are explicitly targeted within anti-immigrant political rhetoric will activate Mexican group interests in voting decisions.

This research offers both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the study of Latino political incorporation. It takes into account the fluidity and complexity of Latino group identity in the United States, forcing a re-evaluation of contemporary social scientific understandings of ethnic cues, intra-group conflict, and assimilation. This dissertation challenges conventional wisdom that all types of anti-immigrant threat resonate among Latino groups by focusing on the conditions that may generate conflict across ethnic groups of diverse national origins. It also intervenes on current notions of assimilation by illustrating the weaknesses in both European and racialized models of immigrant assimilation that exclude Latinos across different national origin groups and generations. Empirically, this investi-

gation uses both statistical and experimental methods to uncover the causal mechanisms behind identity activation in reaction to anti-immigrant appeals documented in recent research (Pantoja et al. 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Barreto 2007). And it allows us to address questions concerning similarities and differences between Mexicans and non-Mexican Latino immigrants in two different cities.

The Study

To achieve these goals, I examine the effect of elite political messages about immigration on processes of collective identity formation among Latinos and how these identity choices influence decisions to vote for a political candidate. Central to this agenda has been the collection of original experimental data to identify the causal mechanisms by which collective identities become salient or not in Latino voting decisions. I compare Latinos in New York City and Los Angeles. New York City provides a diversity of Latino groups beyond the Mexican American experience. In New York City, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans constitute the largest Latino groups. In 2010, Puerto Ricans represented 30.8% of all Latinos, followed by Dominicans at 25.3%, Ecuadorians (8.8%), and Colombians (4.4%). Mexicans only constitute 14.3% of all Latinos in New York City. Los Angeles, on the other hand, is largely concentrated by Latinos of Mexican origin. Mexicans constitute 79.3% of all Hispanics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area, followed by 7.2% of Salvadorans, and 4.3% of Guatemalans (Pew Hispanic Center, 2009 American Community Center). Moreover, the immigration context within these two cities are different. Los Angeles is more often described as a threatening context toward immigrants whereas New York City is defined as more welcoming response to immigrants. A comparison of Latinos within these two cities allows us to assess how different environments affect processes of collective identity formation in voting.

I conducted a total of 582 surveys (of which 192 are used) in New York City during the summer of 2010 and 1,000 (of which 401 are assessed) in Los Angeles during the summer of

2011. In New York City, I collected data from two community colleges: Bronx Community College in the Bronx and La Guardia Community College in Queens. In Los Angeles, data was collected from East Los Angeles Community College, West Valley Occupational Center, Jefferson High, South Gate, and Evans Community Adult Schools. While a majority of my respondents were 21 years of age, Latinos are generally a young population with a median age of 27 (American Community Survey 2009, US Census Bureau).

Individuals completed a survey online and were randomized into 1 of 3 conditions in New York City and 1 of 4 conditions in Los Angeles (with the addition of a control). The primary goal was to uncover the effects of ethnic cues in mobilizing collective identities in a decision not to support a candidate. I find the experimental approach useful in its ability to allow for causal inferences (Lacewell 2004). I organize the dissertation based on my main findings from experiments conducted in each city.

With all experiments, external validity is a concern. An important question that emerges in this research study is whether Latinos in New York City are exposed to anti-immigrant messages at similar rates as Latinos residing in Border States. Debates about immigration and/or immigrants frequently occurs in Border States. These debates have largely been framed around the interests of Mexican immigrants given increasing rates of undocumented immigration over the past two decades. However, the series of immigration marches across U.S. cities in the Spring of 2006 challenge issues of generalizability. The popularity of media outlets such as you-tube and facebook allow political messages to reach subsets of the population beyond the intentions of candidates who seek to air them solely within particular media markets. In the course of 4 short months in 2006, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million protested in the streets of 160 U.S. cities (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and Rim 2009). The vexing question becomes when are non-Mexican Latino groups and later generation descendants motivated to act or not on behalf of the group in debates about immigration. This dissertation offers insight that elite framing can play an important role in how different eth-

nic groups within a social group develop collective understandings of their “group’s” political interests and when such framing can minimize the salience of collective identities in political decision-making. In sum, elite framing around immigration can determine when and how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as “Latinos” or as members of their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985).

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation uses two methods of social scientific inquiry to investigate how different Latino ethnic groups come to think of themselves or identify as members of the “collective” and the implications this has on patterns of political decision-making. It begins with a statistical analysis of national survey data and follows with an analysis of experimental data among non-Mexicans in New York City and Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in Los Angeles.

Essay one offers both a theoretical and empirical exploration of the nuances of Latino identities, the demographic and social processes that contribute to their development, and the ways in which they function in the political world. Using the 2006 Latino National Survey, this paper provides evidence for the existence of national origin, pan-ethnic, and American identities within the Latino community and the specific ways they inform Latino political support on immigrant and non-immigrant policy issues. This paper not only demonstrates the contours of Latino identity, but it also provides an illustration of their distributions among Latinos across different national origin groups and generations. I find evidence that levels of acculturation strongly predict American identification. I also find differences across national origin groups in levels of pan-ethnic identification and consciousness. Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic. I do not find evidence of pan-ethnic identification among Mexicans. The second part of this essay shows how these different forms of Latino identity inform Latino support on immigration policy issues. Lati-

nos with stronger perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic interests are more supportive of pro-immigrant measures. However, this relationship is attenuated by levels of acculturation such that more acculturated Latinos are less supportive of pro-immigrant issues.

While essay one shows discernable patterns in how Latino identify and how they evaluate immigration policies, this empirical approach is hampered by issues of reverse causality. It is incredibly difficult to determine whether Latino identities shape support for immigration measures or whether exposure to debates around immigration activate Latino identities. Moreover, we have suggestive evidence that non-Mexican Latino groups are more likely to identify pan-ethnically than Mexican immigrants. Essay two engages the important question of how exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-immigrant rhetoric shape the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups. Article two illustrates two findings: one, nationality-based cues focused on the interests on Mexicans do not activate Latino group interests in vote choice. Two, only explicit, pan-ethnic cues successfully activate Latino groups in a decision not to support a political candidate.

Essay three examines whether political processes of collective identity formation among non-Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Latinos in Border States. While New York provides an excellent test of how different non-Mexican Latino groups respond to ethnic cues targeting Latino versus Mexican immigrants, the sample is not nationally representative of all U.S. Latinos. I find that not all anti-immigrant political messages resonate among Mexicans as they do for non-Mexican Latino groups. There are conditions upon which identity is activated. In contrast to non-Mexicans in New York City, pan-ethnic interests are not activated by anti-immigrant appeals among Mexicans in Los Angeles. I find evidence that only nationality-based appeals focused on Mexican immigrants activate Mexican group interests in decisions not to support a candidate. These effects, however, do not extend to non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. Pan-immigrant and nationality-based appeals did not activate collective group interests in candidate support. These findings suggest that identity activa-

tion may work differently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration threat.

The concluding chapter draws together the findings from the statistical evidence and experimental research into a coherent whole. It discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation to studies of political psychology and Latino political behavior. It also focuses on the sustainability of Latino identities over time and the implications collective identities have on the politics of Latino incorporation in the US, particularly in the upcoming presidential election of 2012.

– Essay One –

Defining Latino Identities and America's Immigration Debate: Evidence from the 2006 Latino National Survey

“for nearly a century the more-or-less constant presence of large numbers of Mexican immigrants in Mexican American communities has forced Mexican Americans to come to daily decisions about who they are –politically, socially, and culturally – in comparison to more recent immigrants from Mexico”

- David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors*, 1995

Abstract

Latinos have various options in how they identify and mobilize as a group. These choices include national origin, pan-ethnic, or even American based identities. Despite advances in understanding of how shared ethnicity shapes Latino political decision-making, there are still a number of unresolved questions as to how Latinos conceptualize their group and how these forms of group identity shape political preferences. I find evidence that levels of acculturation and national origin strongly predict group attachments. More acculturated Latinos are more likely to identify as American. I also find differences in pan-ethnic identification based on national origin. Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic than Mexicans. Latino identities also inform support on immigrant policy. Latinos with stronger perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic interests are more supportive of pro-immigrant measures. However, this relationship is attenuated by levels of acculturation such that more acculturated Latinos are less supportive of pro-immigrant issues.

Introduction

There is considerable debate in the field of Latino politics as to whether collective group interests influence Latino political decision-making. Current research suggests that perceptions of shared ethnicity shape public opinion and participation. Three contextual factors have been most important to the increasing salience of Latino identity in the United States: (1) the growth of anti-immigrant initiatives in several states (2) the use of partisan campaign media strategies in mobilizing Latino voters in presidential elections and (3) the presence and growth of viable Latino candidates for office in several states and congressional districts (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006; Abrajano 2010).

Conversely, other studies point to increased variation in the level of group-based solidarity achieved among Latinos (Espiritu 1992; Tam 1995; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). For example, most work on pan-ethnic identity find that Latinos strongly identify with their national origin group as opposed to the pan-ethnic identifier “Latino” (Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups as well as geographic differences—Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the Northeast, Cubans in the South Florida, and Mexicans in the West and Southwest—has divided the Latino social experience, contributing to distinct political differences. For instance, early studies from the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) show that Cubans are more solidly Republican than Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, or Dominicans who are solidly Democratic (de la Garza et al. 1992).

Moreover, there is considerable evidence that levels of acculturation shape how Latinos enter and engage in American politics. Theories of assimilation suggest that immigrant-based groups “loosen” their ethnic attachments across generations (Dahl 1961; Alba and Nee 2003). Conflicting patterns emerge in evaluating patterns of assimilation among Latinos. While some scholars point to the continuing salience of ethnicity, there is evidence that processes of acculturation can mediate the effects of shared ethnicity in Latino political decision-making (DeFrancesco and Soto 2006; Abrajano 2010).

Despite advances in our understanding as to whether ethnicity matters in Latino political decision-making, there are a number of unresolved questions as to how Latinos define and/or conceptualize their group. To develop a better understanding concerning the role of ethnicity in political decision-making, I focus on two important research questions: How do Latinos across different national origin groups and levels of acculturation conceptualize their group? And to what extent do Latinos rely upon perceptions of shared ethnicity in their evaluations of immigrant related policy issues? Using national survey data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), this article provides initial evidence that variation exists in

how Latinos identify based on national origin, panethnicity, or American group membership. I also posit that differences in group attachments along these three dimensions of identity inform Latino support on immigrant and social policy issues.

This study also has important political implications for the future of Latino incorporation. First, processes of racialization, experienced by U.S. Latinos across generations and U.S. geographies, may serve as a powerful catalyst for the creation and assertion of a valued, shared identity in the U.S. political arena (Schmidt et al. 2000).¹ The construction of pan-ethnic identities may become more or less salient at given historical and political junctures depending on the nature of racialization (Omi and Winant 1994, Montejano 1987). Two, political elites and activists play a formidable in promoting pethnicity to gain electoral advantage. The U.S. political system rewards those groups with a strong, palpable presence and a set of well-articulated interests (Browning, Tabb, and Marshall 2003; Schmidt 2000; McAdam 1999). The extent to which elected officials and organizations can elicit these pan-ethnic considerations on a national stage as African Americans do through common experiences of language, religion or immigration, pan-ethnic unity may bring symbolic and material rewards for the political incorporation of Latinos as a group.² Thus, this research identifies the circumstances whereby pan-ethnic identities in relation to other salient identities can become politically relevant or not in shaping Latino political preferences.

¹Racialization refers to “the attribution of otherness by members of the dominant Anglo ethnic majority in the United States, and the structural forces of domination, exclusion, and discrimination that have been deployed to develop and act on this widespread attribution”(Schmidt et al. 2000, 565; also see Montejano 1987).

²It is important to note here that pan-ethnic sentiments are not *always* necessary to mobilize upon when sufficient numbers of a national origin are a majority. For example, we can look to Puerto Rican activism in New York, Cubans in Miami, or Mexicans in Los Angeles. However, to extent that Latinos can exert power on a national stage, it will be easier if these different subgroups saw themselves as a part of a larger identity with common, shared interests (see Segura and Rodrigues 2006).

Defining Latino Identities

This article concentrates on the role of collective identities in shaping Latino political behavior. While there are several forms of identity such as gender, education, class, or occupation that can shape an individual's social identity, the goal is to establish how ethnic identities are translated into American politics (Masuoka 2008). I primarily focus on three important categories of group membership in Latino communities: national origin, panethnicity, and American. National origin represents the principle category of group membership for many Latinos. The U.S. Census defines national origin as the heritage, nationality group, lineage, or country of birth of the person or the person's parents or ancestors. There is considerable evidence that Latinos not only strongly identify with their national origin group, but national origin identities strongly influence political choices (de la Garza, DeSipio, Garca, Garca and Falcon 1992; DeSipio 1996). For example, many Cubans in Florida identify with the Republican Party.

Many scholars also posit that a more encompassing Latino identity exists within the American context (Hero 1992; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996; Oboler 1995; Padilla 1985). Once Latinos enter the United States, they are classified as Latino or Hispanic, creating the basis for a shared ethnicity. Panethnicity refers to "the expansion of ethnic group boundaries to include different national or ethnic groups that share a common language, a common culture, or a common regional origin in to an encompassing identity" (Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000). There is considerable disagreement among scholars of Latino politics whether panethnicity is politically relevant given the degree of heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups and across generations (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Portes and Macleod (1996) find that the adoption of a panethnic identity is mediated by acculturation. Immigrants generally prefer the Mexican label whereas nearly half of the U.S. born generations prefer Mexican American. However, by the fourth generation, a higher proportion of Latinos consider themselves as only American (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

There is mixed evidence as to whether Latinos identify with particular concepts of American identity. Social Dominance theory suggests that ethnic group and national attachments are asymmetrical across different groups (Sidanius and Petrocik 2001; Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto 1997). In particular, these two identities are distinct or in conflict for minority groups. Socio-structural realities in American society can constrain the extent to which Latinos identify with core features of national identity. The placement of groups within an economically and racially stratified society accounts for variations in the intensity of national attachments. Devos, Gavin, and Quintana (2010) shows that the exclusion of Latinos within the dominant society is negatively related to the extent to which they identify with the concept American (Devos, Gavin, Quintana 2010).

Latino Ethnicity and Assimilation

Scholars express divergent conclusions about whether Latino Americans are becoming part of a “rainbow underclass” or assimilating in ways reminiscent of European immigrants in previous decades (López and Stanton-Salazar 2001; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Jiménez 2010). Prior research suggests that socio-structural conditions in employment and residential life negatively shape the life chances of immigrants into later generations. For example, studies on intergenerational progress among Mexicans note increases in educational attainment and wages from the first to second generation but a flattening of progress from the second to the third generation. Poor educational opportunities over several generations accounts for the slow assimilation trends within Latino communities (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

Herbert Gans defined these trends as “second generation decline” in which many non-white immigrant children, situated in poor schools and jobs, experience downward assimilation compared to their parents. Portes and Rimbaut illustrate a more complicated pattern of segmented assimilation. Outcomes for the second generation are linked to the human capital of the first generation as well as how government incorporates immigrants. They find that

low human capital among parents along with hostile immigration policies reinforces strong Mexican identities. At the same time, they find that second generation immigrants are less likely to speak Spanish, pointing to a pattern of “Americanization.”

Despite these trends, Portes and Rumbaut do not expect Mexicans to achieve full assimilation in future generations. In fact, they emphasize the role of discrimination in defining the Mexican American experience. More specifically, a hostile context toward Mexican immigrants and their children not only promotes downward assimilation, but reinforces ethnic boundaries. For example, Telles and Ortiz (2008) find that the stigmatization of Mexican origin immigrants and descendants, regardless of acculturation, creates “shared personal and political identities,” which serves as the primary basis for collective action (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Jiménez (2010) argues that on-going immigration into Border States increases the relevance of national origin identities among Mexican immigrants into later generations. As the largest minority group in the Southwest, persistent segregation and isolation reinforces the salience of Mexican identification (Yancey, Erickson, and Juliani 1976). Telles and Ortiz (2008) longitudinal study finds that isolation by virtue of residence in Los Angeles increased national origin identification whereas those more proximate to non-Mexican Hispanics identified as Hispanic or Latino.

Conversely, there is increasing evidence that Latinos are assimilating in ways similar to European immigrants in previous decades. Classical theories of assimilation predict a steady loss of ethnic identification from immigrants to their children, disappearing by the third generation. Social scientists disagree on measures of assimilation. Historical research on European assimilation shows that the children of immigrants made substantial economic and educational gains than their parents by the third generation. Scholars of assimilation have sought to link these measures to the Latino experience, showing little variation in the economic progress of Latino children and parents (Alba and Nee 2003). However, several conflicting patterns emerge when we examine non-economic measures such as language or

ethnic identity. On cultural dimensions such as Spanish language retention, we find some evidence that Spanish fluency gradually recedes over time (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Data from Telles and Ortiz (2008) also illustrate that as Latinos move further away from the immigrant experience they identify less in terms of national origin and increasingly as American. Third generation descendants are three times likely to identify as American than first generation immigrants. These expectations lead to the following hypotheses on Latino identity choices:

National Origin Identification:

H2: Immigrants are more likely to identify with their national origin group than the native-born

H1: Latinos of Mexican descent are more likely to identify on the basis of national origin membership.

Pan-ethnic Identification:

H3: Latinos with greater perceptions of discrimination are more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic

American Identification:

H4: More acculturated Latinos are more likely to identify as American than less acculturated Latinos.

Latino Identities and Immigration Attitudes

DeSipio (1996) argues that that “ethnicity will come to play less of a role in [Latino] political decision-making than will other societal divisions” (DeSipio 1996, 8). Instead of relying on ethnicity, Latino voters will base their decisions on more traditional predictors of political participation. However, scholarship in Latino politics in the past decade has challenged this empirical evidence, suggesting that ethnic voting persists among Latinos and shapes political decision-making.

For example, empirical evidence suggests that discrimination plays a significant role in politicizing Latinos along ethnic-based lines in the United states (Barreto 2007; See also

Sanchez 2006b). The ethnically charged immigration context found in Border States such as California, Texas, and Arizona offers insight. During the 1990s in California, for example, residents voted on statewide referendums to restrict public services to illegal immigrants (Proposition 187 in 1994), end affirmative action (Proposition 209 in 1996), and end bilingual education programs (Proposition 227 in 1998). All three passed with strong support from White voters. Latino voters, majority of whom were of Mexican origin, strongly opposed all three measures. For example, 63 percent of Whites to 23 and 24 percent of Latinos, respectively, supported Propositions 187 and 227. These voting differences suggest that Latinos may be more likely to side with other Latinos on political issues that directly affect their community (Barreto 2007). In sum, individuals who share a common identity with members of a stigmatized group will rely upon shared group interests in opposition to policy measures unjustly targeting their group.

There is considerable evidence that processes of acculturation can mediate support for pro-immigration policies. Theories of assimilation predict a steady-loss of ethnic identification over time and across generations. Thus, “assimilated” individuals should instead inherit the characteristics of the dominant, majority group (Subervi-Velez 1986). Both DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla (2006) and Abrajano (2010) find strong empirical evidence that acculturated Latinos assimilate accessible information from the political environment differently than less acculturated Latinos. In examining the effects of Spanish-language political advertisements on Latinos, they find that ethnically targeted political ads have a weaker effect on those following an assimilationist route to acculturation as measured by an individual’s proficiency in English. Thus, I expect the following:

H5: Latinos with high perceptions of shared national origin and/or pan-ethnic group interests will more likely to support pro-immigrant policies.

H6: Latinos with higher levels of acculturation will be less supportive of pro-immigrant policies.

Data, Measures, and Method

To test this model I use data from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS). The LNS is recognized for its size and scope; it contains a total of 8,634 Latino adults sampled in 16 states. Overall, 41% of interviews were conducted in Spanish and 59% in English. The survey was conducted between November 17, 2005 and continued through August 4, 2006. The LNS is the most ideal dataset to examine identity considerations among Latinos given its large sample size across generations and national origins. The LNS contains 420 Cubans, 5,704 Mexicans, 822 Puerto Ricans, 335 Dominicans, 333 Central Americans, and 407 Salvadorans. It is a unique national data source for this reason.

Measuring Latino Identities

The LNS includes an array of questions exploring collective group interests. Here I restrict my attention to Latinos' identification with their national origin group, the pan-ethnic identifier "Latino," and American identity. Both national origin and panethnic identities are composed of four variables: group identification, linked fate, and perceptions of shared economic and political commonality. The LNS only includes a measure of group identification for American identity. Thus, perceptions of American linked fate, shared economic and political commonality with other Americans cannot be assessed using this survey.³ Table 1.1 is a classification table that presents the survey questions used to measure each of the three categories of Latino group identity.

Perceptions of national origin interests is assessed using four variables: national group identification, linked fate, and perceptions of economic and political commonality of the national origin group to other Latinos and Hispanics. To measure national origin group identification, I use the following question: "how strongly do you think of yourself in terms

³I do include these variables in my own experimental survey in New York City and Los Angeles

Table 1.1: Dimensions of Latino Group Identity

	National Origin	Pan-ethnic	American
Group Identification	How strongly or not do you think of yourself as (national origin descriptor)?	How strongly or not do you think of yourself as Hispanic or Latino?	How strongly or not do you think of yourself as American?
Linked Fate	How much does [national origin descriptor] “doing well” depend on how other Hispanics or Latinos are doing well?	How much does your “doing well” depend on other Latinos/Hispanics also doing well?	
Economic Commonality	Thinking about issues like job opportunities, education or income, how much do [national origin descriptor] have in common with other Latinos or Hispanics?	Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do you have in common with other Latinos or Hispanics?	
Political Commonality	Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do [national origin descriptor] have in common with other Hispanics or Latinos?	Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation, how much do you have in common with other Latinos/Hispanics?	

of your national origin group.” National group Linked fate measures the degree to which subjects believe their national origin group’s “doing well” depends on other Latinos or Hispanics.

Lastly, economic and political commonality gauges the extent to which individuals believe their own national origin shares common economic or political status with other Latinos or Hispanics in this country. Each variable on the national origin group index is scaled from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating “Very Strong” or “A lot” of support for the preceding statements.⁴

Similar questions are used to create an index for pan-ethnic identity. In terms of identification, respondents are asked how strongly they define themselves in terms of Latino or Hispanic. Linked fate measures the extent to which subjects believe their fate is linked to that of all Latinos or Hispanics. I capture perceptions of economic and political commonality by asking subjects whether they share common job or political opportunities (see Table 1.1) with other Latinos and Hispanics in this country.

Unfortunately, the LNS does not include the same variables of linked fate, economic, or political commonality for American group identity. In this case, I simply rely on a measure of group identification; assessing how strongly Latinos identify themselves as American.

The Determinants of Latino Identities

To understand how Latinos choose to identify on the basis of national origin membership, pan-ethnic affiliation, or American group status, Figure 1.1 illustrates the percentage of respondents who strongly identify or express a high degree of solidarity on each survey question.⁵ About 64 and 65 percent of Latinos, respectively, identify in terms of their national origin group and as Latinos. However, only 41% very strongly identify as American.

Less than 50% of Latinos strongly perceive they share common job opportunities, income, or education with their national origin group or with Latinos. For example, only 45% very strongly agree they share common economic status with their national origin group.

⁴The LNS also includes a question of identification that ask subjects: “of the three previous terms, Latino or Hispanic, national origin group, or American, which best describes you?” While not included in the index, this variable is important, and I provide summary descriptors for this variable in Appendix A.

⁵Individuals who selected 4 on a scale from 1 to 4 are examined in Figure 1.1

We observe these same patterns in pan-ethnic attitudes. For example, 38% perceive they very strongly share job opportunities, income, and education with other Latinos or Hispanics in this country. Perceptions of political commonality are even lower, only 24% very strongly agree they share issues of political power and representation with other Latinos and Hispanics.

Figure 1.1: Percentage of Latinos Who “Very Strongly” Identify by National Origin, Pan-ethnic, or American group Membership (by Survey Question)




Figure 1.1 illustrates the percentage of Latinos who strongly identify along each identity consideration: national origin, Latino, or American by survey question. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Table 1.2 presents the summary statistics of each identity consideration index. The National Origin index is composed of four questions. The range of this index is between 4 and 16, with 16 indicating a high degree national origin solidarity. The average score on this index is 12.87. Similarly, the pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16. The average score is 12.26. Since the LNS does not include comparable measures for American identity, I illustrate the average score on perceptions of American identification among Latinos. The average score on this American Identity measure is 3.03 on a scale from 1 to 4.

Table 1.2: Summary of Group Index Variables

	Mean	Median	Range
National Origin Index	13.2	13	4 to 16
Pan-ethnic Index	12.26	12	4 to 16
American	3.03	3	1 to 4

Here I present the average, median, and range of index for national origin, pan-ethnic, and American group identity. The National origin and pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16 since they are composed of four survey questions all scaled from 1 to 4. The LNS does not include comparable measures for American group identity, so I rely upon on survey question of American identification. This is scaled from 1 to 4. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Table 1.3 illustrates the average on each identity index by generational status and national origin group.⁶ We observe a downward trend in perceptions of ethnic group interests across generations. First generation immigrants have a higher propensity, on average, to identify by national origin group or as “Latino.” This decreases significantly by the fourth generation. Conversely, we observe an upward trend in American identification by generational status. Third and fourth generation Latinos are more likely to identify themselves as American. We do not observe significant differences across national origin groups to identify by national

⁶I define first generation immigrants as those persons born outside the United States. I define second immigrants as those born within the United States whose parents are born outside the United States. I included those with both or one parent born outside the United States. Lastly, third generation immigrants are those born within the United States and with parents born within the United States. However, grandparents are born outside the United States.

origin or panethnicity. However, both Cubans and Puerto Ricans have higher scores in identifying as Americans compared to Mexicans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans.

Table 1.3: Mean Score of Group Index by Generational Status and National Origin

	National Origin Index	Panethnic Index	American	N
First Generation	13.08	12.41	2.79	6184
Second Generation	12.63	11.98	3.56	1465
Third Generation	12.16	11.77	3.72	698
Fourth Generation	11.22	11.59	3.85	198
Mexicans	12.88	12.24	2.93	5704
Puerto Ricans	12.96	12.32	3.47	822
Cubans	12.79	12.11	3.41	420
Salvadorans	13.17	12.61	2.93	407
Dominicans	13.46	12.77	3.04	335

Here I present the average score for each identity index by generational status and national origin. The National origin and pan-ethnic index ranges between 4 and 16 since they are composed of four survey questions all scaled from 1 to 4. The LNS does not include comparable measures for American group identity, so I rely upon on survey question of American identification. This is scaled from 1 to 4. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

To predict an individual's likelihood to identify along each of these three forms of Latino identity, I ran two OLS (national origin and pan-ethnic identities) and one ordered logit (American identification) model using each index as the dependent variable. I control for several demographic variables. These include education, income, age, gender, national origin group, acculturation, Catholic religion, perceptions of discrimination, and state context. To measure acculturation, I control for immigrant status (foreign-born versus native-born), length of residence within the United States ⁷, and survey language. ⁸

To assess perceptions of discrimination, respondents were asked four questions: 1) Have

⁷Length of Residence is re-coded as a binary variable such that those with US residence of at least 5 years or more are coded as 1. Those with less than 5 years residence are coded as 0. While 5 years seems arbitrary, provisions under the The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996 stipulates that legal permanent residents are eligible to apply for social welfare programs after 5 years.

⁸Survey language is coded as a binary variable such that those who conducted the survey or interview in English are coded as a 1. Those who conducted the interview in Spanish are coded as 0.

you ever been unfairly fired or denied a job or promotion? 2) Have you ever been unfairly treated by the police? 3) Have you ever been unfairly prevented from moving into a neighborhood (vecindario o barrio) because the landlord or a realtor refused to sell or rent you a house or apartment? 4) Have you ever been unfairly or badly at restaurants or stores? If a respondent answered yes to any of these four questions, they were coded as 1 to indicate perceptions of ethnic discrimination.

Similar to Masuoka (2008), the state context variable controls for respondent's living in California. Given the history of anti-immigrant legislation during the mid-1990s with the passage of ballot initiatives 187 (Denying undocumented immigrants access to social services) and 227 (eliminating bilingual education), prior research illustrates that threatening environments increase the salience of ethnicity (Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Masuoka 2008). To control for these possible events, I control for Latinos living in California.

Table 1.4 presents the determinants of Latino identity along dimensions of national origin, panethnicity, or American identity. Consistent with my hypothesis on factors predicting an individual's attachment to national origin, I find that immigrant status (born outside the United States) is a significant predictor of the strength of national origin identity. Immigrants are more likely to have higher perceptions of national origin identity than native-born descendants.

I also predict that Mexicans, given their growth and experiences of racialization in the United States, will have stronger perceptions of national origin identity than other national origin groups (H2). For each model in Table 1.4, I estimated the strength of identity with Puerto Ricans as the excluded category given their status as American citizens compared to other Latino national origin groups. While Mexican origin is a significant predictor of the strength of one's national origin identity as compared to Puerto Ricans, this is not significantly different from other Latino national origin groups. Dominicans and Salvadorans are

just as likely to have relatively strong perceptions of national origin identity as Mexicans.

I also find that English language negatively predicts attachment with a national origin identity. This provides support for hypothesis four that Spanish dominance decreases support for American identification. While model illustrates results for national origin interests, I find that the strength of national origin identity declines with proficiency in English. We also find evidence that Latino respondent's living in California are also more likely to identify in terms of their national origin group.

In terms of pan-ethnicity, I predict that perceptions of discrimination will increase pan-ethnic groups interests (H3). Model two of Table 1.4 illustrates these results. I do not find any support for this hypothesis. The model, however, does reveal several trends in pan-ethnic identification. I find again that immigrant status and English proficiency are significant predictors of an individual's likelihood to identify as Latino or Hispanic. Immigrants as compared to native-born Latino descendants are more likely to identify panethnically.⁹ Moreover, Spanish dominant individuals are more likely to identify pan-ethnically than English dominant Latinos. We also observe differences between Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in their likelihood to identify pan-ethnically. While we find that most Latino national origin groups with the exception of Cubans identify by national origin (model one), model two illustrates that only Dominicans and Salvadorans are likely to have stronger attachments to pan-ethnic group interests. Mexican ethnicity is not a significant predictor of pan-ethnic group consciousness.

Lastly, I investigate the impact of acculturation in predicting Latinos' decisions to identify as American. I hypothesize that acculturated Latinos will be more likely to identify

⁹Portes and Rumbaut 2001 show evidence of segmented assimilation by second generation immigrants. Experiences with discrimination and low human capital drive second generation Latino immigrants on a downward path of assimilation into a "rainbow underclass." Based on this logic, we might expect that second generation Latinos will be more likely to identify as Latino or Hispanic. In the appendix, I include variations by generational status with those in the fourth generation as the excluded in the model predicting pan-ethnic identity. However, I find little evidence that second or third generation Latinos significantly identify as Latino/Hispanic.

Table 1.4: Determinants of Latino Identities

	National Origin	Pan-ethnic	American
Discrimination	0.01 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)
Foreign-Born	0.42 *** (0.08)	0.25 ** (0.09)	-1.31 *** (0.07)
English-Dominant	-0.65 *** (0.08)	-0.67 *** (0.08)	1.09 *** (0.07)
Time in US	0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.12 (0.05)
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 *** (0.01)	0.02 ** (0.01)
Education	0.05 * (0.02)	0.08 *** (0.02)	0.08 ** (0.01)
Family Income	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.06 * (0.01)
Female	0.01 (0.06)	0.20 ** (0.06)	-0.38 ** (0.05)
Catholic	0.16 (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)
Mexican	0.21 ** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	-0.36 ** (0.07)
Dominican	0.62 *** (0.16)	0.36 * (0.17)	0.02 (0.13)
Salvadoran	0.46 ** (0.16)	0.34 * (0.16)	-0.10 (0.13)
Cuban	0.09 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.16)	0.23 (0.13)
California	0.18 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.07 (0.07)
Intercept	12.31 (0.19)	12.03 (0.20)	
1 2			-1.60 (0.16)
2 3			-0.42 (0.16)
3 4			1.09 (0.16)
N	5856	5934	6364

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey. Results are derived using OLS and ordered logit. Standard errors are included in parenthesis. The excluded national origin category is Puerto Rican.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

as American. Model three of Table 1.4 illustrates these results. Native-born Latinos are significantly more likely to identify as American than immigrants. Moreover, English language positively predicts Latinos' attachment to American identity. Also, Mexican origin is negatively correlated with American identity, suggesting that Mexicans are significantly less likely to identify as American.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the probability of "very strong" American identification by levels of acculturation as measured by immigrant status and language. Native-born Latinos have a 63% likelihood of very strongly identifying as American whereas foreign-born immigrants are only 33% likely to strongly identify as American, a 30 percent difference. We observe these same differences between Spanish and English dominant Latinos. English speakers are 57% likely to very strongly identify as American compared to 32% among dominant Spanish speakers.

In summary, the evidence presented above illustrates that Latino identities are not fixed categories. Acculturation plays a significant role in predicting the strength of national origin, pan-ethnic, and American identities among segments of the Latino population. The strength of ethnic identity as presented in Table 1.4 follow assimilation patterns of identity erosion between immigrants and native-born Latinos (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Immigrants are significantly more likely to identify in terms of their national origin or as Latinos/Hispanics. They are also significantly less likely to identify as American as compared to native-born Hispanics. Acculturation, as measured by English proficiency, significantly predicts identity choices. The strength of American identification largely depended upon English language. Those who conducted the survey in English were more likely to identify as American whereas those who conducted the survey in Spanish were more likely to identify in terms of their national origin or Latino. Another interesting finding that emerges is across national origin groups. I do not find any evidence that Mexicans identify as Latino or Hispanic. Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to identify as Latino/Hispanic with the exception of Cubans.

Moreover, residence in California is strongly correlated with the strength of national origin identity. Articles two and three investigate differences in collective identities in New York City and Los Angeles, CA between non-Mexicans and Mexicans in further detail using an experiment.

Figure 1.2: Probability of “Very Strong” American Identification by Levels of Acculturation




Figure 1.2 illustrates the predicted probability of very strong American identification by acculturation as measured by immigrant status and language, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Latino Identities and Policy Support

I now consider the impact of Latino identities on support for immigrant versus non-immigrant policies. The LNS also contains a battery of questions assessing support for various policies. My dependent variables measure Latino support for immigrant versus non-immigrant related policies.¹⁰ I define immigrant-defined policies as those pertaining to

¹⁰Appendix C includes all survey questions and question wording for the dependent variables described here.

immigration or the rights and/or privileges of immigrants within the United States. Within the LNS, I include three measures for immigrant-based policies: opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented at state colleges and universities (TUITION), support for the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants (IMMIGRATION), and opposition to English immersion programs (IMMERSION). Respondents indicate the extent to which they strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support various policy measures. Each item is recoded to indicate pro-immigrant opinions. For example, strong opposition to tuition increases or English immersion programs are recoded from 1 to 4.

I also compare support to non-immigrant policies. Respondents are asked whether they strongly oppose, oppose, support, or strongly support military intervention in IRAQ, government INCOME support, HEALTHCARE reform, and school VOUCHERS. Table 1.5 illustrates the average response to each policy measure. These preliminary results illustrate that Hispanics support immigrant-defined issues. A large number of Latinos are strongly opposed of tuition increases for undocumented immigrants at state colleges and universities. They also support more lenient policies pertaining to undocumented immigration into the United States. Many support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. On the other hand, Latino support to replace bilingual education with English immersion is relatively low with an average of 2.51.

In comparing these scores to non-immigrant related policies, we find that Latinos significantly support government intervention on social policy issues. On a scale from 1 to 4, the average respondent strongly supports government efforts to provide income support for those who need it. These same pattern of results are seen in support for health-care reform. Many believe the government should improve access and reduce costs within the US health-care system. We find relatively little support for military intervention in Iraq as well for school vouchers. These trends may reflect the partisan affiliations of the Latinos within the LNS. About 36% of Latinos within the LNS identified with the Democratic Party.

Table 1.5: Average Response on Policy Measures

	Average Response
Immigrant-Defined Policies	
Tuition	3.36
Immersion	2.51
Immigration	3.23
Non-Immigrant Defined Policies	
Keep troops in Iraq	1.98
Government Income Support	3.30
Healthcare Reform	3.47
School Vouchers	2.61

Table 1.5 presents the average score for each policy measure. Each variable is scaled from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating strong support for each of the policy measures. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

To understand how perceptions of shared ethnicity influence support for immigrant versus non-immigrant defined social policies, I rely upon ordered logit regression. Each index of collective identity - national origin, pan-ethnic, and American - is included in each model as an independent variable. I also control for education, income, age, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, national origin group, length of residence within the US, survey language, California residence ¹¹, and partisan identification.

Table 1.6 illustrates the results for Latino immigration attitudes. I predict that Latinos with high perception of ethnic group interests - national origin and pan-ethnic - will be more pro-immigrant on issues relating to the status and rights of the undocumented. This hypothesis is confirmed in models predicting Latino opposition to tuition increases and support for immediate legalization. Model one of Table 1.6 specifies opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented. We observe that Latinos with high perceptions of both national origin and pan-ethnic group interests are significantly more likely to oppose policies that charge undocumented immigrants higher tuition rates at state colleges and universities. Conversely, those with higher levels of American identification are less likely to oppose tuition increases

¹¹I control for California residence only within models predicting support for immigrant policies

among the undocumented. Consistent with my hypotheses regarding the effects of acculturation (H6), I find that native-born immigrants and English proficiency predicted less opposition to tuition increases for illegal immigrants at state colleges. Immigrants are more likely than descendants to oppose higher tuition rates for the undocumented. Moreover, English-dominant Latinos are less likely than Spanish-dominant Latinos to support charging undocumented immigrants higher rates.

Table 1.6: Impact of Latino Identities on Immigrant Policies

	Tuition		Immersion		Immigration	
Latino Identities						
National Origin	0.06 ***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.07 ***	(0.01)
Pan-ethnic	0.03 ***	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)	0.03 **	(0.01)
American	-0.15 ***	(0.03)	-0.11 **	(0.04)	-0.12 ***	(0.03)
Acculturation						
Foreign-Born	0.21 ***	(0.08)	-0.27 **	(0.10)	0.50 ***	(0.07)
English-Dominant	-0.39 ***	(0.08)	-0.01	(0.10)	-0.88 ***	(0.07)
Time in US	-0.06	(0.02)	0.01	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.06)
Intercepts						
1—2	-2.10 ***	(0.27)	-1.27 ***	(0.34)	-2.52 ***	(0.26)
2—3	-1.33 ***	(0.26)	-0.04	(0.34)	-1.03 ***	(0.25)
3—4	0.03	(0.26)	1.11 ***	(0.34)	1.00 ***	(0.26)
N	5335		2611		5186	

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English proficiency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan identification (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.) See Appendix D for an illustration of the full models

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

To assess the magnitude of these effects, I illustrate in Figure 1.3 the change in the predicted probability between high and low national origin, pan-ethnic, and American group identifiers in strong opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented. I estimate these effects for each identity consideration holding all other variables at their mean or modal

values (female). The difference between Latinos of high and low perceptions of national origin group interests in predicting strong opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented is 15 percent. The difference between high and low pan-ethnic identifiers is 9 percent such that Latinos with higher perceptions of pan-ethnic interests are 9 percent points more likely than Latinos with lower perceptions to oppose tuition increases for illegal immigrants. Lastly, the difference between Latinos with high versus low levels of American identification is 10 percent. In this case, Latinos with higher levels of American identification were 10 percent less likely to support this measure than those with lower levels of American identification.

Figure 1.3: Change in “Strong Opposition” to Tuition Increases for the Undocumented between Low versus High Group Identifiers




Figure 1.3 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of strongly opposing tuition increases for the undocumented between low and high national origin, panethnic, and American group identifiers, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

I also assess the impact of acculturation on tuition increases for illegal immigrants. I find that immigrant status and English proficiency are strong predictors of opinions on this issue. The difference between foreign-born and native-born Latino immigrants in strongly opposition tuition increases is only 5 percent, suggesting that foreign-born immigrants are only 5 percent more likely than native-born descendants to oppose tuition increases for the undocumented at state colleges. Similarly, the difference between English and Spanish dominant Latinos is 9 percent.

Model two demonstrates support for English immersion.¹² While I predict that national origin and pan-ethnic group interests should predict support for immigrant issues, I only find that American identification matters in predicting this relationship. However, the results run in the opposition direction that my predictions. Latinos with higher levels of American identification are less likely to support initiatives to replace bilingual instruction in schools with English immersion programs.

Lastly, model three predicts support for immigration policies pertaining to undocumented immigration. This dependent variable is re-scaled such that high scores indicate support for the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. These findings confirm both hypotheses regarding the effects of identity and acculturation on support for immigration policies. I find that Latinos with greater perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic group interests are significantly more likely to support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants. This relationship is reversed for those with higher levels of American identification; highly identified Americans are less likely to support open borders.

To assess the magnitude of these effects, I demonstrate in Figure 1.4 the change in the predicted probability of supporting the “immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants” between high and low national origin, pan-ethnic, and American group identifiers, holding all

¹²This variable is rescaled such that strong opposition is ranked higher on a scale from 1 to 4 to indicate a pro-immigrant stance on the issue.

other variables at their mean or modal values (female). Again, we find comparable results as Figure 1.3, predicting strong opposition to tuition increases for undocumented immigrants. The difference in the probability of supporting immediate legalization is 0.16 or 16% between Latinos of low versus high perceptions of national origin group interests. Moving from low to high perceptions of pan-ethnic considerations produces a change of only 8% in supporting the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants. Moreover, there is a negative difference for Latinos with high levels of American identification. High American identifiers are 7 percent less likely to support the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants than low American identifiers.

Figure 1.4: Change in Support for the Immediate Legalization of the Undocumented between Low versus High Group Identifiers




Figure 1.4 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants between low and high national origin, panethnic, and American group identifiers, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Consistent with my hypotheses regarding the effects of acculturation, foreign-born immigrants have a higher likelihood of supporting immediate legalization than the native-born. Moreover, English-dominant individuals are significantly less likely to prefer open border policies. Holding all variables at their mean and modal values, I assess the impact of each measure of acculturation on support for the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants. Figure 1.5 illustrates these differences. In terms of immigrant status, the native-born have a 34% likelihood of supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants whereas immigrants have a 44% probability on this same measure. We also observe differences in language. Spanish dominant Latinos have a 49% probability of supporting immediate legalization compared to 31% among English-dominant Latinos, a difference of 18%. Given that the 95% confidence intervals overlap, we need to be cautious over-stating the significance of these findings. However, these results are suggestive of how acculturation shapes Latino behavior. More acculturated Latinos have a lower probability of supporting open borders than less acculturated Latinos.

In summary, the results illustrate a strong relationship between Latino identities and support for pro-immigrant policy measures. We find two patterns of results. First, while we cannot illustrate causality, the results point to a strong relationship between Latino identities and immigrant policies. Those with higher levels of national origin and pan-ethnic group interests were more supportive of immigrant interests as related to the Dream Act and open borders. Surprisingly, this relationship is not observed in maintaining bilingual education programs. While Proposition 227 (efforts to end bilingual education) garnered opposition from Latinos in 1998 in California, there may be a shift in the politics of language 14 years later. Another possibility might be related to the question wording. The survey question is framed around replacing bilingual education programs with English immersion programs which does not sound as harsh as English-only laws. More research is necessary to uncover these differences in framing.

Figure 1.5: Probability of Supporting the Immediate Legalization of Undocumented Immigration, by Acculturation




Figure 1.5 illustrates the predicted probability of supporting the immediate legalization of undocumented immigrants by acculturation (immigrant status and language), holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Second, the results also illustrate some patterns of assimilation that are often neglected in models predicting continued racialization within the Latino experience (Telles and Ortiz 2008). I rely upon three measures of acculturation: immigration status (foreign versus native-born), English versus Spanish dominance, and time spent in the United States. In each of these ordered logit models, immigration status and language are important predictors of immigrant policy support. Immigrants are more likely to express strong support for these policy measures than the native-born. Moreover, those with higher levels of acculturation as measured by English language are significantly less likely to support tuition increases for the undocumented or policies securing the immediate legalization to undocumented immigrants.

These results on acculturation are in direct contrast to the findings presented by Telles and Ortiz (2008). On the question of whether the United States should have an open border policy with Mexico, they find that opinions did not vary among descendants as compared

to their children. Nearly half of all immigrants (47 percent) agreed compared to 41 percent among fourth generation Mexican Americans. Telles and Ortiz' (2008) relies on a sample of households in Los Angeles County and the City of San Antonio. These two places are largely Mexican. Telles and Ortiz' study is also hampered by selectivity issues given problems of locating and interviewing respondents from the original survey in 1965. The benefits of the LNS is that it is a national survey of Latinos throughout the United States based on random-digit dialing. These differences in results might be explained by sampling issues inherent within the design of these two surveys.

Measuring Support for non-Immigrant Policies

Another test to evaluate the strength of this relationship between Latino identities and immigrant policy attitudes is to assess the role of collective identities in other social policy domains. Do Latinos rely upon identity in their decisions regarding non-ethnic issues? In this next section, I estimate the effect of Latino identity considerations on support for four non-immigrant policy measures in the LNS: support to keep troops in Iraq, government income support, healthcare reform, and school vouchers. Table 1.7 presents coefficients and standard errors for ordered logit models predicting support for each of these measures.

Model one of Table 1.7 estimates support to keep U.S. troops in Iraq in order to stabilize Iraq's government. I do not find any support that national origin or pan-ethnic group considerations influence support for continued U.S. intervention in Iraq. On the other hand, American identification significantly influences strong support for continued intervention to stabilize the government of Iraq. Those with higher levels of American identification were significantly more likely to support U.S. troops in Iraq. Moreover, the coefficient for English-dominant Latinos is significant and positive, suggesting that English proficiency is positively correlated with support to keep U.S. troops in Iraq.

Model two examines support for government income support to the poor. Here, we ob-

Table 1.7: Impact of Latino Identities on Non-Immigrant Policies

	Iraq	Income	Health	Vouchers
Latino Identities				
National Origin	-0.02	(0.01) 0.03 *	(0.01) 0.03 **	(0.01) 0.02
Pan-ethnic	-0.01	(0.01) 0.06 **	(0.01) 0.05 **	(0.01) 0.03
American	0.21 ***	(0.03) -0.04	(0.03) 0.01	(0.03) 0.01
Acculturation				
Foreign-Born	0.01	(0.08) -0.06	(0.07) 0.03	(0.08) 0.23 *
English-Dominant	0.22 **	(0.08) -0.23**	(0.07) -0.37 **	(0.08) -1.12 ***
Time in US	-0.01	(0.05) -0.02	(0.06) 0.01	(0.06) -0.01
Intercepts				
1—2	0.59 *	(0.27) -3.05 ***	(0.26) -2.05 ***	(0.27) -1.12 **
2—3	1.63 ***	(0.26) -2.05 ***	(0.25) -1.24 ***	(0.26) 0.09
3—4	2.61 ***	(0.26) -0.03	(0.25) 0.62 *	(0.26) 1.42 ***
N	5035	5293	5310	2560

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English proficiency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan identification (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.) See Appendix D for an illustration of the full models

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

serve that pan-ethnic group interests matter in predicting Latino support for government income support. Individuals with higher perceptions of pan-ethnic considerations are more likely to support social welfare policies that provide income support to those who need it. Conversely, acculturation as measured by language negatively predicts government income support. English dominant Latinos are less likely to support redistributive policies. However, the difference between Spanish and English-dominant individuals is only 5 percent in predicting strong support for government income assistance to the poor.

Model three predicts Latino support for healthcare reform. Similarly, we find that a positive relationship exists between Latino identity considerations and support for government intervention to improve access and reduce costs. Latinos with higher perceptions of ethnic group interests as defined national origin or panethnicity are significantly more likely to support healthcare reform. Acculturation is also negatively correlated with strong support for healthcare reform. English-dominant Latinos are less likely to support government intervention on issues relating to access and quality within the U.S. healthcare system. In terms of language, I only find a difference of 8 percent between Spanish and English-dominant individuals in support for government intervention to improve the healthcare system.

Figure 1.6 illustrates the impact of national origin and pan-ethnic considerations on those who “strongly support” government income support for the needy and government intervention in improving the U.S. healthcare system. Here I illustrate the change in probability in strong support for these two policy measures between low versus high ethnic group identifiers, holding all other variables constant at their mean. The difference in strongly supporting income support between Latinos with low versus high national origin considerations is only 8 percent. This difference is twice as large among pan-ethnic identifiers. Among low and high pan-ethnic identifiers the difference is 16 percent in the likelihood of strongly support government income support. In other words, high pan-ethnic identifiers are more likely to support income support for the needy. We find these same pattern of effects in predicting

strong support for health care reform. Latinos with greater perceptions of national origin consciousness are 8 percent more likely than those with less to strongly support government improvement in the U.S. healthcare system. Similarly, we observe a 13 percent difference between low and high pan-ethnic identifiers on this same measure.

Lastly, model four illustrates coefficients and standard errors for Latino support on school vouchers. Here I do not find any correlation between collective group interests and support for school vouchers. National origin, pan-ethnic, or American group interests do not predict support for school vouchers. The only significant variable in this model is language. English dominant individuals are significantly less likely to support school vouchers.

Figure 1.6: Change in “Strong Support” for Government Income Support and Healthcare Reform between low and High Ethnic Group Identifiers




Figure 1.6 illustrates the change in the probability of strongly supporting government income support for the “needy” and government improvement in the US health care system between low and high ethnic group identifiers, holding all other variables at their mean or modal values.

Discussion and Conclusion

In 2006 and 2010, Latinos challenged their status as the "sleeping giant" of American politics. Despite high levels of non-citizenship, low levels of education and income, mass protests took place across U.S. cities. For many who study public opinion and political behavior, an important question is why some individuals are motivated to participate while others are not (Bedolla 2005). For many excluded racial and ethnic minority groups, collective identity is an important variable to this equation.

In this paper, I have focused on three primary forms of Latino group identity: national origin, pan-ethnic, and American. While prior literature points to the persistence of ethnicity across generations, I find some evidence of identity erosion across levels of acculturation (Telles and Ortiz 2008). More acculturated Latinos are less likely to identify in terms of their national origin or pan-ethnic group and are more likely to identify as American. We also observe differences by national origin in the likelihood to identify as Latino or Hispanic. Non-Mexican Latino groups such as Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to identify pan-ethnically whereas we do not find the pan-ethnic identifier salient among Mexicans. Moreover, Mexicans are less likely to identify as American.

The findings presented also indicate that Latino identities are relevant to political attitudes. Within the domain of immigration politics, I find that both national origin and pan-ethnic identities are strongly correlated with strong opposition to tuition increases for the undocumented as well as support for the immediate legalization of illegal immigrants. Ethnic identity considerations also extend to attitudes regarding social welfare policies. Latinos with higher perceptions of national origin and pan-ethnic group interests have a higher propensity to support income support for the needy and government intervention to improve our nation's healthcare system. However, these relationships are attenuated by levels of acculturation. More acculturated Latinos, as defined by native-born or dominant-English speakers, were less likely to support immigrant inclusion or social welfare policies.

The issue of immigration has and will continue to play a central motivating role in Latino politics. The nature and rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric within political media, the increase in partisan campaign strategies targeting Latinos, and the frequent usage of the term “Latino” or “Hispanic” all contribute to the construction of pan-ethnic group attachments among U.S. Latinos across a diversity of national origins. While DeSipio (1996) argued that “ethnicity will come to play less of a role in [Latinos] political decision-making than will other societal divisions,” I find that Latinos do rely upon ethnic group attachments in constructing their views on immigrant policy.

What explains the salience of identity in social welfare policies? While the results are suggestive, they show a relationship between identity and politics. In the past decade, various political debates have linked Latino identity with social policy issues. At different political junctures, the interests of immigrants and their descendants have been tied to discussions about welfare and even healthcare. For example, the issue of governmental income support is a politically salient issue within the Latino community. Immigrant access to state services was contentious in the 1990s. The 1996 welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, barred legal immigrants who entered the country after August 22, 1996 from receiving means-tested, federally funded assistance. This included Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps. Moreover, immigrants living in the county as of that date were barred altogether from Food Stamps and SSI programs until they became citizens. These policy debates regarding immigrant access to state services were most pertinent in California. In 1994, California voters supported proposition 187, which sought to deny state services to undocumented immigrants. Many Latinos perceived these policies as threatening to Latino interests. As a response, we observe increased rates naturalization and voting among newly naturalized citizens throughout the state of California (Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005).

American healthcare debates have also been framed around the politics of immigrant exclusion. In debates about access to health services, undocumented immigrants are often often criticized for the rise in uncompensated healthcare costs. In September of 1993 and again in 2008, both President Clinton and Obama excluded undocumented immigrants within their proposals to reform the healthcare system. Many Latino groups and organizations place issues of healthcare reform as top priority in their efforts to mobilize the Latino community. Issues of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease are important issues within the Latino community. Thus, ethnic group considerations may provide an important lens as to how many Latino individuals evaluate policies involving healthcare access and quality.

Issues of Reverse Causality

Overall, this research provides a explanatory lens to future research. Will group identities persist over time? If we observe suggestive patterns of identity erosion and “assimilation,” what implications exist for the future incorporation of Latinos as a group? While this cross-sectional survey offers a foundation for studying the relationship between Latino identities and politics, longitudinal data is needed to determine whether Latino identities will persist over time in determining how Latinos enter and engage in politics. Moreover, issues of causality and post-treatment bias are a concern. This empirical approach does not demonstrate a causal relationship between Latino identities and immigrant attitudes. We do not know with certainty whether shared ethnicity increases support for immigration policies or whether exposure to immigration policies activate collective group interests.

Moving Forward

The findings from essay one point to important differences in the nature of national origin and pan-ethnic identification among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. While most

Latino groups identify in terms of national origin with the exception of Cubans, there are differences in the extent to which many identify as Latino or Hispanic. Whereas Dominicans and Salvadorans are more likely to identify pan-ethnically, Mexicans do not. The next two essays make progress toward the goal of better understanding these differences across Latino groups and the causal mechanisms under which perceptions of collective group interests are activated in political decision-making. I conduct two experiments estimating the effects of immigrant political rhetoric on the salience of Latino identities among non-Mexicans and Mexicans in two cities – New York City and Los Angeles.

– Essay Two –

Activating “Latino” Identity: Ethnic Cues, Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric, and the Response of Non-Mexican Latino Groups

“While we all may speak a version of our Spanish colonizer’s language, contrary to popular belief, we’re not all Mexican. Yes, the majority of Latinos in America are of Mexican descent, but we also hail from other countries around the world.”

- Raquel Cepeda, ‘But what’s a Latino?’, CNN, October 22, 2009

Abstract

This paper engages with the important question of how exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-immigrant political messages shape the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups. I argue that explanations on the salience of shared ethnicity in Latino voting behavior focus exclusively on the experiences of Mexican Americans, raising the issue of generalizability to other Latino national origin groups. In a laboratory experiment, I test the effects of explicit and implicit pan-ethnic and nationality-based cues on Latino candidate support. The results illustrate significant differences in the activation of identity among non-Mexican Latino groups in response to immigration debates. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants in elite immigration discourse, nationality-based cues about Mexican immigration are not effective in mobilizing collective identity in the voting decisions of non-Mexican groups. I find that only explicit cues to Latino identity successfully activate Latino group interests in a decision not to vote for a political candidate. These findings not only suggest that identity activation works differently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration threat, but they also challenge the notion of a “one size fits all” political strategy in Latino political mobilization.

Introduction

There is considerable evidence that threatening political environments mobilize immigrants to naturalize, protest, and even vote in terms of larger, collective group interests (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006). Consider California’s electoral landscape between 1994 and 1998 with the enactment of propositions 187 and 227. The campaign targeted undocumented immigrants by denying access to state services and ending bilingual education programs. While these

initiatives were pivotal in the re-election of Republican Governor Pete Wilson, they also increased Latino voter participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006). Recall the series of immigration marches across U.S cities in the spring of 2006 and 2010. In the course of four months, an estimated 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protested in the streets of over 160 U.S. cities against increased penalties for undocumented immigrants (Barreto, Manzano, Ramirez, and Rim 2009).

Largely overlooked in the discussion of shared ethnicity is how political messages about immigration increase or decrease the salience of identity among non-Mexican Latino groups. Much of previous research focuses on the political experiences of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006). While Mexicans have become the largest immigrant and minority group in the United States, we know considerably less as to whether processes of collective identity formation among Mexicans are generalizable to other Latino national origin groups. Does shared ethnicity influence how Latinos, regardless of national origin membership, engage in politics, or is it necessary for issues to be defined in pan-ethnic terms to mobilize all Latinos collectively? Given shared experiences of immigration and racialization in the United States, most research shows that all anti-immigrant political messages resonate across Latino national origin groups (Barreto 2007; Telles and Oritz 2008). However, little quantitative research validates this claim. Heterogeneity across Latino national origin groups as well as differences in residential patterns - Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in the Northeast, Cubans in South Florida, and Mexicans in the West and Southwest - has divided the Latino experience, contributing to distinctive social and political differences (Segura and Rodriguez 2006; García Bedolla 2005).

While the immigration experience - moving from one's homeland to the U.S. - is certainly shared across groups, the circumstances of immigration are quite different. Puerto Ricans

began their migration to the U.S. as American citizens. Cubans were mostly given refugee status in the 1960s. Between 1962 and 1979, thousands entered the US under the Attorney General's parole authority. Other groups such as Salvadorans and Guatemalans have similar experiences as Mexican labor migrants, however their immigration to the U.S. is recent and relatively smaller (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Dominicans entered the United States as lower-wage manual workers after 1965 yet many often experience racialization as blacks (Itzigsohn and Dore-Cabral 2000).

With these considerations in mind, I examine the degree to which exposure to explicit and implicit cues within anti-immigrant rhetoric increase or decrease the salience of collective identities in Latino vote choice among non-Mexican Latino groups. I argue that the activation of Latino group identity cannot be presumed to be automatic or equal for non-Mexican Latino groups as they are for Mexicans in contexts of American immigration discourse. To evaluate the political decisions of non-Mexicans, I consider two types of political contexts that shape Latino vote choice: (1) explicit-and-implicit immigrant rhetoric and (2) pan-ethnic versus nationality-based political appeals. Given the repeated association of visual and verbal cues implicating Mexican immigrants in debates about immigration and immigrants, nationality-based cues about Mexican immigration may not be particularly effective in mobilizing non-Mexican groups along collective lines. In a laboratory experiment in New York City, I find that exposure to explicit and implicit cues focused around the interests of Mexicans do not activate Latino group interests in vote choice; only explicit, pan-ethnic appeals increase Latino group interests. The empirical results from this study have broader implications on the future incorporation of Latinos across national origin groups in the United States. The findings not only suggest that collective identity activation may work differently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration threat, but they also challenge the notion of a "one size fits all" political strategy in Latino mobilization.

Contexts of Threat Reconsidered

Political scientists have identified three contextual factors most important in mobilizing shared ethnicity in Latino voting: (1) the growth of anti-immigrant initiatives in several states (2) the use of partisan campaign media strategies in mobilizing Latino voters in presidential elections and (3) the presence and growth of viable Latino candidates for office (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Defrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006; Abrajano 2010). Despite advances in our understanding within this theoretical framework, we have not produced conceptual and empirical clarity about the political conditions under which perceptions of shared ethnicity should or should not matter in Latino political decision-making.

Social identity theory (SIT) provides a useful framework to understand group-based behavior in American politics. Group behavior is dependent upon the extent to which different groups come to think of themselves or identify as members of the collective (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1982). Threat plays a significant role in the construction of social identities. For example, previous research shows that experiences with discrimination motivate later generation Mexican Americans to identify with the experiences of their immigrant co-ethnics, increasing the salience of Mexican identity (Keefe and Padilla 1987; Padilla and Perez 2003; Jiménez 2010). However, social scientists have paid little attention to differences between non-Mexicans and Mexicans in response to immigration political appeals. Telles and Ortiz (2008) argue that other Latino groups are “perceived, labeled, and treated as Mexicans” (Telles and Ortiz 2008, 12). In their view, the historical stigma that is most generally attached onto Mexicans is generally inscribed onto other persons from Latin America. Based on this logic, all anti-immigrant appeals, regardless of whether they target the collective group or Mexicans, should mobilize shared ethnicity in Latino political mobilization. Yet, it is less clear whether this can be generalized beyond contexts where non-Mexican groups are not frequent or direct targets of anti-immigrant political appeals.

The preceding discussion highlights the need for a conceptual framework that takes into account the responses of non-Mexican Latino groups to anti-immigrant political appeals. Given the very different historical and contemporary experiences of different Latino groups, the activation of collective group interests cannot be assumed to be automatic by all types of immigration appeals in the political environment. There are conditions by which these identities can become salient or not in political decision-making.

Branscombe and colleagues (1999) identify three types of threat that can presumably reduce perceptions of common identity. I focus on two that are likely to affect perceptions of intragroup conflict in the discussion of racial and ethnic politics.¹³ *Categorization* threat occurs when individuals perceive that out-group members are imposing a negative category label upon them that is likely to result in differential treatment. This is mostly associated with high status minority group members such as affluent Latino and Caribbean blacks who due to high income and status may identify more with non-Hispanic whites than their own group (Richeson and Craig 2011). Moreover, García Bedolla (2005) finds evidence of categorization threat among acculturated Latinos in Los Angeles. Interviews with East Los Angeles respondents, a working class Latino area, reveals that many were against proposition 187 because of its anti-Mexican sentiments. Respondents in Montebello, a predominantly middle class suburb of Los Angeles, expressed more ambivalence. While more than 80 percent of East Los Angeles respondents cited their identification with immigrants as reason for their opposition against Proposition 187, only 30 percent of Montebello respondents cited this same reason. *Distinctiveness* threat occurs when group members perceive that a particular category is too large of a numerical majority to provide a substantive benefit for self-identification (Richeson and Craig 2011). For example, some individuals may perceive that the panethnic label “Latino” or “Hispanic” undermines the distinctiveness of their own

¹³Branscombe and her colleagues also point to processes of value threat. Value threat stems largely from an individual’s view that their own group is perceived more negatively compared to other groups. However, the predicted effects on collective identity are less clear (Richeson and Craig 2011).

national origin group. The consequence is dis-identification from the in-group.

Building from research in social psychology and racial politics, I argue that the political salience of shared ethnicity can wax or wane according to political messages in the environment. Elite discourse about immigration and/or immigrants in political media can foster or minimize collective mobilization among Latinos across different national origins. For group-based mobilization to occur, Latinos must perceive a sense of solidarity and unity within their own economic and political experiences. Elite framing is critical to the mobilization of collective identities. Successful frames not only identify the “injustice” or benefit of a policy or position to a particular social group, but they identify the “identities of the contenders, distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’” (Polleta and Jasper 2001, 291). However, differences in the salience of group attachments across Latino national origin groups can moderate the impact of a frame, creating divisions in how Latinos come to understand their collective interests within immigration and/or immigrant related debates. To the extent to which anti-immigrant political messages focus on the interests of a particular national origin group different from an individual’s national origin, non-Mexican groups may not rely upon collective identities in defining their political preferences (Richeson and Craig 2011; see also White 2007). In sum, such cues within immigration debates have the potential to disrupt group-based politics.

Research Hypotheses

I consider two types of political contexts that are likely to promote or disrupt ethnic boundaries in Latino vote choice: (1) explicit-and-implicit political rhetoric and (2) pan-ethnic and nationality-based political appeals. I argue that pan-ethnic appeals, those focusing on the interests of the collective group, will be most effective in priming Latino group interests in candidate support. In response to an explicit or implicit pan-immigrant cue, Latinos will increase their reliance upon Latino group considerations in their evaluation of

candidates. I define explicit, pan-ethnic cues within anti-immigrant political rhetoric as messages that use words such as “Latino” or “Hispanic” to express anti-immigrant sentiment, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from Latinos. Implicit, pan-ethnic appeals convey the same messages as explicit messages, but they replace these words with more subtle references to Latinos without using collective terms such as Latino or Hispanic. For example, phrases such as low-skilled immigrants are often used to define Latinos implicitly (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Both explicit and implicit pan-ethnic cues will activate Latino group considerations since they define a collective interest affecting all Latinos within the issue of immigration. Thus, I hypothesize:

H1: Non-Mexican Latino groups will be less likely to support a candidate when exposed to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant political appeals.

H1A: Non-Mexican Latino groups with higher perceptions of Latino group interests will be less likely to support a candidate under exposure to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant political appeals

Nationality-based appeals, in this case, focused around the interests of Mexican immigrants may not be as effective in activating pan-ethnic group thinking in vote choice among non-Mexican groups given their distance from localized immigration debates. The repeated association of visual and verbal cues in news media that focus on undocumented Mexican immigration may be grounds for the dismissal of Mexican-based cues among Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, Colombians, or Ecuadorians. While these groups are connected through shared experiences of immigration, the marginalization of Mexicans by illegal immigration in the public mind increases the salience of intragroup differences. To the extent that immigration cues center on the interests of Mexican immigrants, such messages may not increase collective group interests in Latino candidate support (see White 2007 on African Americans). This leads to the following expectation:

H2: Non-Mexicans' preference not to vote for a candidate promoting explicit or implicit nationality-based appeals will not be a (direct) function of Latino group interests.

Counter-stereotypical appeals are likely to have minimal effects on panethnic considerations. These appeals counter stereotypes related to immigration by portraying groups that are typically discussed in debates about high-skilled immigration. Canadians and European immigrants are mostly defined within these debates in efforts to protect American workers against high-skilled immigration (Hochschild and Cropper 2010). This model is conceptually illustrated in Figure 2.1.

H3: Absent a cue to Latino ethnicity, non-Mexicans should use traditional indicators such as partisanship in their evaluation of candidates when exposed to counter-stereotypical appeals (anti-Canadian cue)


Methods and Procedures

To examine how key aspects of elite discourse about immigration mobilize or de-mobilize collective identities in candidate support, I rely upon an experimental design. I embed an audio news clip from National Public Radio (NPR) within a web-based survey.¹⁴ I manufactured these audio clips to appear as embedded you-tube clips from NPR. Upon arriving for the study, participants were asked whether they prefer to complete the survey in Spanish or English and are randomized into one of five treatment conditions. I rely upon a post-test only design to avoid contamination of the treatment by pre-test measurement (McConaughy, White, Leal, Casellas, 2010). The primary goal is to avoid questions that may prime identity before the experimental cue is given. Thus, all measures except for basic demographic questions are asked after subjects are exposed to the treatment.

Subjects are told that I want their reactions to a news story recently featured on NPR. Participants then listen to a two-minute mock news report about a Congressional Repre-

¹⁴I rely on software from Qualtrics to design my web-based survey.


Figure 2.1: Activating Collective Group Interests in Candidate Support



Conceptual framing of how exposure to pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical messages about immigration activate Latino group interests in decreased candidate support

sentative named Nicholas Wilson running for office in California. To prevent pretreatment effects, I designed an audio clip similar to online clips from NPR. Utilizing the services of Voice 123.com, one bilingual voice actor performed the news scripts in English and Spanish. Figure 2.2 provides an example of the web-based platform featured in the experiment.

Figure 2.2: Web-Based Version of Audio Clip: Anti Pan-ethnic Frame



The news anchor details Representative Nicholas Wilson's view regarding the consequences of immigration without reference to the candidate's political party affiliation. All messages feature the same identical argument emphasizing the potential costs of increased immigration, which include driving down wages and increasing competition with American workers. What changes across conditions is the group discussed by the congressional representative. The representative stresses the need to tighten our current immigration laws with each anti-immigrant condition. Each of these frames directly or indirectly targets Latinos, Mexicans, or Canadian immigrants.

Table 2.1 provides a brief description of the experimental treatments used in this study. The explicit, pan-ethnic frame emphasizes the potential costs of increased Latino immigration. Opposition to immigration is linked to the threat of immigrants from all Latin American countries. Given increased media attention on issues of border control and national security, explicit nationality-based appeals are expressed through the lens of Mexican immigration. Instead of linking all Latinos to problems of immigration, Mexican immigrants are explicitly defined.

Table 2.1: Verbal Cues in Anti-Immigrant Frames

Explicit Cues		
Pan-ethnic	Nationality Based	Counter-Stereotypical
Representative Wilson stated quote: “In order to have comprehensive immigration reform now, we need to tighten our current immigration laws. [<i>Latino</i>] immigrants not only drive down the wages of American workers, but they increase competition. Congress needs to move on this issue now and we cannot wait.”	Representative Wilson stated quote: “In order to have comprehensive immigration reform now, we need to tighten our current immigration laws. [<i>Mexican</i>] immigrants not only drive down the wages of American workers, but they increase competition. Congress needs to move on this issue now and we cannot wait.”	Representative Wilson stated quote: “In order to have comprehensive immigration reform now, we need to tighten our current immigration laws. [<i>Canadian</i>] immigrants not only drive down the wages of American workers, but they increase competition. Congress needs to move on this issue now and we cannot wait.”
Implicit Cues		
Pan-ethnic	Nationality-Based	
Representative Wilson stated quote: “In order to have comprehensive immigration reform now, we need to tighten our current immigration laws. [<i>Low-skilled</i>] immigrants not only drive down the wages of American workers, but they increase competition. Congress needs to move on this issue now and we cannot wait.”	Representative Wilson stated quote: ”In order to have comprehensive immigration reform now, we need to tighten our current immigration laws. [<i>Border-crossers</i>] not only drive down the wages of American workers, but they increase competition. Congress needs to move on this issue now and we cannot wait.”	

Implicit messages employ subtle references to Latinos as a cohesive group or Mexicans. The implicit, pan-ethnic frame focuses on the costs of increased immigration from low-skilled immigrants. Current research shows that individuals tend to associate low-skilled immigration with Latinos (Brader et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). The implicit, nationality-based frame utilizes the same framing as explicit messages, but replaces direct references to Mexicans with nouns or adjectives in reference to immigrants crossing the border. I expect the label “low-skilled” immigrant to carry an implicit connection to Latino immigrants. Since issues of immigration reform are expressed through border security and Mexican-based immigration, I expect cues about “*immigrants crossing the border*” to carry an implicit connection to Mexican immigrants.

Counter-stereotypical appeals exclude any direct references to Latinos. Explicit, counter-stereotypical appeals, in this case, implicate Canadian immigrants in arguments to decrease continued immigration. Canadian and European immigrants are both overtly and implicitly implied in debates regarding high-skilled immigration (Hochschild and Cropper 2010). This provides some validation in using Canadian immigrants as a counter-stereotypical appeal since they are relatively high skilled compared to Caribbean or Mexican immigrants. Thus, I expect counter-stereotypical appeals not to activate Latino group interests in candidate support.

After listening to the NPR news story, participants answer a brief post-test battery of questions concerning their reactions to the news script. To confirm that the messages are in fact perceived as different by subjects, respondents then answer a series of questions confirming accurate descriptions of the news story. Finally, subjects complete an extensive battery of post-test questions about their intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson, their identity considerations, their support for various immigration policies, and opinions toward immigrants. Upon completion, subjects are debriefed and paid.¹⁵

¹⁵Participants were only told that the clip they listened to was not featured on National Public Radio in order to evaluate identity considerations two-weeks later. At the end of the survey, participants were

The experiment was carried out in computer labs at Bronx Community College (BCC) in the Bronx, New York and LaGuardia Community College in Queens, New York.¹⁶ I recruited students, staff, and non-student adult subjects to participate by distributing flyers throughout areas surrounding each university. Subjects received 10 dollars cash for their participation at the end of the survey. While students constitute a majority of the sample, it is important to note that both La Guardia and BCC enroll students from a wide array of age and socioeconomic groups than most private or state universities. The experiment was conducted at LaGuardia Community College from June 21, 2010 to August 6, 2010 and Bronx Community College from August 16 to September 22, 2010 and takes an average of 30 minutes to complete. A total of 192 non-Mexican Latino groups participated in the experiment. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the number of participants in each condition.

Table 2.2: Experimental Conditions and Sample Size

	Explicit Cues		Implicit Cues	
Pan-Immigrant:	Anti-Latino	(N=36)	Anti-Low Skilled	(N=40)
Nationality-Based:	Anti-Mexican	(N=37)	Anti-Border	(N=39)
Counter-Stereotypical:	Anti-Canadian	(N=40)		

reminded that they agreed to participate in a follow-up interview by phone or email two weeks later, at which point they answered 10 similar questions from the first phase of the experiment pertaining to identity. To retain subjects for the two-week follow-up, participants' names were placed in a raffle to win 100 dollars at the end of the experimental study. While the results are not included in this paper, the response rate for phase 2 of the experiment was nearly 31%.

¹⁶The experiment is conducted in NYC given the City's growth and diversity in Latino nationalities. Latinos accounted for 28% of NYC's total population in 2008. Approximately 50% of Puerto Ricans and 35% of Dominicans reside in the Bronx; the two largest Latino groups in the borough. Queens is more diverse demographically across Latino subgroups. About 25% of Puerto Rican and Ecuadorians reside in Queens compared to Dominicans (18%), Mexicans (16%), and Colombians (14%).

Participant Demographics

Table 2.3 provides a snapshot of the demographics of participants across all conditions. The median age of participants is 21 years old, ranging between 18 and 72 years, and the average participant graduated from high school. The top six ethnic groups represented include Dominicans (41%), Puerto Ricans (22%), Ecuadorians (9%), Colombians (10%), Peruvians (5%), and Salvadorans (3%).¹⁷ The sample is also similar in terms of gender, 47 percent male and 53 percent female. Moreover, 39 percent of participants are first generation immigrants, 53 percent are second generation, and 7 percent are third generation.¹⁸ Approximately 20% of respondents reported that they were naturalized citizens.¹⁹ In terms of ideology and partisanship, 24 percent are liberal and about 59 percent classified themselves as “middle of the road.” Moreover, 49 percent identified themselves as Democrats.

This sample is not perfectly representative of all US Latinos, but is representative of Latinos in New York City. Table 2.4 compares demographics for Latinos in the U.S. and New York City. The median age for U.S. Latinos is 27 and 31 years old in New York City (2009 American Community Survey, US Census, Latino Population of New York City, 2009). Approximately 24 percent of U.S. Hispanics have graduated from high school. This percentage is relatively the same in New York City with 26.6% completing high school. The median family income of all U.S. Latinos is 40,000 and is slightly lower in New York City (35,800). Mexicans are the largest Hispanic origin group in the United States, representing almost 65% of all Latinos (2009 American Community Survey, US Census). In New York

¹⁷The missing 10 percent includes Mexicans. However, this is excluded in the following empirical models.

¹⁸I define first generation immigrants as those persons born outside the United States. I do not include the 1.5 generation immigrants, those who immigrate early in life, within this category for empirical simplicity given the size of this sample. With greater numbers of respondents, it may be possible to isolate this group. I define second immigrants as those born within the United States whose parents are born outside the United States. I included those with both or one parent born outside the United States. Lastly, third generation immigrants are those born within the United States and with parents born within the United States. However, grandparents are born outside the United States.

¹⁹Participants were asked in the survey whether they are naturalized citizens. About 119 respondents or 61% of respondents skipped this question in the survey. I believe much of the confusion involves the term “naturalized citizen.” I correct for this in the next chapter by excluding the term naturalized.

Table 2.3: Participant Demographics

Demographic Characteristics	
Age (Median)	21
Education	High School Graduate
Income	35,000 - 44,999
Gender (% Female)	53%
First Generation	39%
Second Generation	53%
Third Generation	7%
Naturalized Citizen	20%
Unreported Citizenship	59%
Dominican	41%
Puerto Rican	22%
Ecuadorian	9%
Colombian	10%
Peruvian	5%
Salvadoran	3%
Political Characteristics	
"Middle of the Road"	59%
Democrat	49%

The percentage of Latino national origin groups collected in this study does not add up to 100% since Mexican participants were excluded for analysis

City, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans constitute the largest Latino groups. About 32.9% of New York City's Latino population is Puerto Rican and 24.9% is Dominican. The 2006 Latino National Survey indicates that 13.1% of Latinos consider themselves liberal and 34% identify as Democrat. There are significant differences in American citizenship between U.S. Latinos and those in New York City. Of all US Latinos, only 43.7% are U.S. citizens whereas 75% of Latinos in New York City are American citizens. This may reflect demographic differences between Latinos in the United States and New York City. Mexicans represent almost 65% of all US Latinos and a significant portion of Mexican are non-citizens. However, Puerto Ricans, who represent the largest Latino national origin group in New York City are citizens by birth. Despite these differences, this NYC sample does contain reasonable

variation along several important demographic indicators and provides an interesting case study of how non-Mexican Latino groups in non-Border States respond to immigrant political rhetoric.

Table 2.4: Demographics of US and NYC Latinos

	US Latinos	NYC Latinos
Age	27	31
Education (Completed High School)	23.7%	26.6%
Family Income (Median)	\$40,000	\$35,800
Mexican	65%	13.5%
Puerto Rican	9.1%	32.9%
Salvadoran	3.6%	1.6%
Cuban	3.5%	1.7%
Dominican	2.8%	24.9%
Guatemalan	2.2%	1.3%
Colombian	1.9%	4.9%
Honduran	1.3%	1.8%
Ecuadorian	1.3%	8.9%
Peruvian	1.2%	1.1%
Liberal	13.1%	
Democrat	34%	
US Citizenship	43.7%	75%

Source: American Community Survey, 2009, Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2000 Census (5% IPUMS) and 2009 American Community Survey (1% PUMS), 2010 Census Summary File 1, 2006 Latino National Survey, Latino Population of New York City 2009, Center for Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies, CUNY

Measuring Exposure and Manipulation Checks

To verify that individuals were exposed to a political message, I asked respondents to recall the representative's name and the specific group discussed in the news story. Approximately 82 percent of all participants accurately recalled the name of the primary representative mentioned in the story. Moreover, 88 percent of participants recalled that the central topic discussed in the news report was about immigration compared to other answer choices

which included the economy, education, the Iraq War, or Apple's iPad tablet. I also asked respondents to recall the group mentioned in the news clip. Answer choices include Latino immigrants, Mexican immigrants, Canadian immigrants, low-skilled immigrants, border-crossing immigrants, and high-skilled immigrants. About 83 percent of individuals within the anti-Latino condition accurately recalled the Latino immigrants were mentioned in the news report. The percentage of respondents is slightly higher in the anti-Mexican condition (92 percent). Moreover, 80 percent of subjects in the anti-Canadian condition accurately recalled the group mentioned. On the other hand, subjects were not able to accurately recall the group mentioned in the low-skilled and border-crossing conditions. Approximately 58 percent in the low-skilled recalled this group was mentioned compared to 46% in the border-crossing condition.

As a manipulation check of the implicit cues, I asked subjects at the end of the post-test battery to indicate which groups come to mind reading the following news headlines, "Low-Skilled Immigration Top Priority for Representative" and "Border-Crossings Top Priority for Representative." The answer choices included Latino, Mexican, Asian, European, and Canadian immigrants. In terms of low-skilled immigrants, 40 percent of participants believe low-skilled immigrants are Latino immigrants and 37 percent mention Mexican immigrants. Here, there is not a clear consensus as to whether participants have all Latinos or just Mexicans in mind when it comes to low-skilled immigrants. Moreover, 76 percent of participants indicate that Mexican immigrants come to mind reading a news headline about border-crossings into the U.S whereas only 12 percent mentioned Latino immigrants. At least at the preliminary level, the data suggests that exposure to explicit or implicit cues around Mexican and Latino immigration create images of particular national origin groups within political elite immigration debates.

Determinants of Vote Choice

The first pattern of results to evaluate is whether non-Mexicans express less of a preference to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson under exposure to pan-ethnic political appeals in which Latinos are collectively targeted. In this case, I simply calculated the percentage of all subjects who intend to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson in each condition. Only 19% of all respondents in the anti-Latino condition indicated they would vote for Wilson compared to 23% in the anti-border and anti-Canadian condition, 27% in the anti-Mexican condition, and 33% in the anti-low skilled condition.

I model subjects' intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson as a function of each treatment with those exposed to the counter-stereotypical appeal (or the Anti-Canadian appeal) as the baseline condition. Table 2.5 displays these results. I find that both explicit and implicit anti-immigrant appeals are not statistically different from the baseline (Anti-canadian) condition.

Table 2.5: Predicting Vote Support, by Condition


	Coefficient	Standard Error
Anti-Latino	-0.85	(0.40)
Anti-Low Skilled	0.28	(0.53)
Anti-Mexican	-0.03	(0.55)
Anti-Border	-0.09	(0.56)
Intercept	-0.85	(0.40)
N	164	

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

Figure 2.3 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Representative Nicholas Wilson across each condition. While the directions of the resultant differences in the level of

support for Representative Wilson are consistent with my hypothesis (H1), the differences are not statistically significant. Despite these insignificant differences across conditions in predicting vote support, we cannot rule out the possibility that the type of message made little difference in the vote calculations of non-Mexican Latinos. There may be differences in the considerations subjects bring to bear on their decisions not to support Representative Wilson across conditions. Therefore, I turn to evaluate the causal mechanisms under which different anti-immigrant appeals might shape voting preferences for non-Mexican Latino groups.

Figure 2.3: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson by Condition



This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 2.5 predicting vote support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian condition as the baseline. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition

Latino Group in Candidate Support

I now consider the role of collective group interests in shaping Latino vote choice. The racial politics literature defines two components of racial group interests that are critical to the political process: perceptions of linked fate and evaluations of relative economic group status (Dawson 1994). I compare levels of linked fate, shared economic and political interests with other Latinos as well with one's own national origin group across experimental conditions. Latino Linked fate is measured asking subjects the extent to which they believe what happens to other Latinos or Hispanics in this country has something to do with what happens in their own lives (Dawson 1994). National linked fate is measured using the same question, substituting Latino identification with an individual's national origin group. Latino economic interests are measured assessing the degree to which subjects believe they share common job opportunities, education, or income with other Latinos or Hispanics. National economic interests are measured asking respondents whether they share common job opportunities, education, or income with their own national origin group. Latino political interests are evaluated asking subjects whether they share "things like government services and employment, political power, and representation" with other Latinos or Hispanics. National political interests are assessed using the same preceding question, but replaces "Latino/Hispanic" with the respondent's national origin group. I also create an index for each dimension of Latino identity. The National Origin index is a summary of national origin linked fate, national origin economic commonality, and national origin political commonality. Similarly, pan-ethnic considerations is a summary of Latino linked fate, Latino economic commonality, and Latino political commonality. Each index ranges from 4 to 12, with 12 indicating greater perceptions of collective group interests. Mean scores for each identity consideration along with each index across conditions is included in Table 2.6. Across conditions, ethnic identity considerations are relatively balanced.

I hypothesize that non-Mexicans with higher perceptions of Latino group interests will be

Table 2.6: Mean Levels of Collective Identity Considerations

	Anti-Latino	Anti-Mexican	Anti-LS	Anti-Border	Anti-Canadian
Pan-ethnic					
Latino LF	2.64	2.70	2.92	2.74	2.60
Latino Economic	2.74	3.05	2.95	3.10	3.02
Latino Political	2.73	2.86	2.80	2.67	2.86
Summary (Pan-ethnic Interests)	8.26	8.64	8.67	8.51	8.47
National Origin					
National LF	2.42	2.60	2.45	2.61	2.33
National Economic	3.06	3.09	2.95	2.67	2.74
National Political	2.93	2.60	2.79	2.47	2.68
Summary (National Origin Interests)	8.63	8.33	8.18	7.76	7.79

Linked fate (LF), economic, and political interests are scaled from 1 to 4 with 4 indicating “alot.” “Latino” refers to the respondent’s opinion about the pan-ethnic group. “National” indicates respondent’s opinion about their own national origin group. I create an index for national origin and Latino group interests. The index for Latino group interests includes Latino linkedfate, Latino economic commonality, and Latino political commonality. The index for national origin interests includes National Linkedfate, National economic commonality, and political commonality. Each index ranges from 4 to 12, with 12 indicating high perceptions of ethnic group interests.

less likely to support a candidate using pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals (H1A). Table 2.7 displays my results of this second test. Each column represents a separate logit regression equation where voting support for Representative Wilson is regressed upon each identity consideration separately (listed in the column head), dummy variables for each treatment condition (with those exposed to anti-Canadian appeals as the excluded category), and interactions between each identity consideration and treatment to capture the slope shift associated with exposure to each anti-immigrant appeal. Based on this model specification, I can compare the baseline effect (anti-Canadian appeal) of identity with the impact of those same identity consideration in the presence of various explicit and implicit appeals targeting Latino immigrants. To guard against the possibility that socio-demographic variables might account for differences observed, I control for household income and foreign-born status in each model (See Table E.1 in Appendix for covariate balance check across conditions).²⁰ The functional form of the model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Voting for Representative Wilson} = & B_1(\text{Identity Consideration}) \\
& + B_2 (\text{Anti-Latino Condition}) \\
& + B_3 (\text{Anti-Latino Condition} * \text{Identity Consideration}) \\
& + B_4 (\text{Anti-Mexican Condition}) \\
& + B_5 (\text{Anti-Mexican Condition} * \text{Identity Consideration}) \\
& + B_6 (\text{Anti-Low Skilled Condition}) \\
& + B_7 (\text{Anti-Low Skilled Condition} * \text{Identity Consideration}) \\
& + B_8 (\text{Anti-Border Condition}) \\
& + B_9 (\text{Anti-Border Condition} * \text{Identity Consideration}) \\
& + B_{10} (\text{Controls}) + \text{Constant}
\end{aligned}$$

My second hypothesis hinges most directly on the direction and magnitude of coefficient B_3 . Table 2.7 presents all the coefficients and standard errors for the effect of pan-ethnic considerations. My predictions are unidirectional such that if pan-ethnic considerations are

²⁰This decision was largely driven by looking at the covariates across each condition. Median household income is 25,000-34,000 in each condition except the Anti-Mexican condition, which has a median household income of 35,000-44,999. The Anti-Mexican condition is also composed of 27% of first generation immigrants whereas the percentage of first-generation immigrants range from 39 to 46% in all other conditions.

Table 2.7: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson with Pan-ethnic Attitudes, by Condition

	Latino LF	Latino Economic	Latino Political	Summary
Identity Consideration (see column heading)	-0.36 (0.47)	0.77 (0.54)	0.62 (0.52)	0.15 (0.21)
Conditions				
Anti-Latino	-1.45 (1.82)	3.84 (2.18)	5.14 (2.26)	3.82 (2.52)
Anti-Mexican	-0.48 (1.81)	1.96 (2.37)	2.94 (2.12)	2.20 (2.56)
Anti-Low Skilled	0.91 (1.81)	4.59 (2.46)	3.14 (2.06)	3.70 (2.52)
Anti-Border	-0.66 (1.76)	0.61 (2.53)	2.58 (2.05)	1.68 (2.62)
Interactions				
Anti-Latino: Identity	0.41 (0.65)	-1.48 * (0.74)	-2.06 * (0.82)	-0.51 . (0.30)
Anti-Low Skilled: Identity	-0.18 (0.64)	-1.44 . (0.80)	-1.01 (0.69)	-0.40 (0.29)
Anti-Mexican: Identity	0.16 (0.64)	-0.67 (0.74)	-1.04 (0.71)	-0.26 (0.29)
Anti-Border: Identity	0.22 (0.64)	-0.25 (0.77)	-1.00 (0.72)	-0.22 (0.30)
Controls				
Foreign-Born	-0.18 (0.64)	-0.24 (0.38)	-0.35 (0.39)	-0.19 (0.39)
Income	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Number of cases	162	161	157	157

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The model “summary” that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.


primed, the interactions will be negative given Representative Wilson’s anti-immigrant position. I expect pan-ethnic political appeals, those targeting Latinos collectively, to increase the salience of Latino group interests in decreased voting support for Representative Nicholas Wilson among non-Mexican Latino groups (H1A).

Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that Latino group interests structure the voting preferences of non-Mexican Latinos. Individuals with higher perceptions of “Latino” group interests will be less likely to vote for Representative Wilson under exposure to pan-ethnic appeals. In model two (Economic) of Table 2.7, the coefficient for the interaction between Latino economic interests and the anti-Latino cue is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. When the candidate explicitly targets Latino immigrants, non-Mexicans with high perceptions of shared economic interests with other Latinos are significantly less likely to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson. Although significant at the 10% level, I also find that exposure to implicit pan-ethnic appeals (anti-low skilled condition) activate perceptions of shared economic interests with Latinos in a decision not to support Representative Wilson. However, a conventional standard of statistical significance is a level of 5% or lower. Yet, is worthy of note, in this case, based on my general hypothesis that non-Mexicans with higher perceptions of Latino group interests will be less likely to vote for Representative Wilson under exposure to both explicit and implicit pan-ethnic political appeals.

To assess the magnitude of these effects, I plot in Figure 2.4 the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson between low and high economically identified Latinos across all five experimental conditions with 95% confidence intervals. The difference between low and high economic identifiers in voting for Representative Wilson within the anti-Latino condition is 0.38 or 38%. When exposed to an explicit cue about decreasing Latino immigration, non-Mexicans who perceive they share “nothing” in common with other Latinos economically, have an 50% likelihood of voting for Representative Nicholas Wilson whereas those who perceive they share “a lot” in common with other Latinos economically only have

a 12% likelihood of voting for this same candidate. We observe a similar pattern of results for those exposed to an implicit pan-ethnic appeal (anti Low-Skilled condition). Again, the interaction between Latino economic interests and the anti low-skilled condition is significant at the 0.10 level. Yet, it is worthy of note here that the difference here between low and high economic identifiers in voting for Representative Wilson within the anti low-skilled condition is 0.40 or 40%.

Figure 2.4: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Latino Economic Interests and by Condition



This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model 2 (Economic), Table 2.7 predicting vote support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian condition as the baseline with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest probability of Wilson support among high economic identifiers.

While the 95% confidence intervals overlap, there is still a significant difference in the means, particularly in the anti-Latino condition where the interaction between shared Latino eco-


nomie interests and the anti-Latino condition is significant at the 0.05 level. Generally, when comparing two parameter estimates, it is always true that non-overlapping confidence intervals indicate statistical significance. However, this is a conservative test. If two confidence intervals do overlap, as presented in this case, the difference between the two means are still significantly different (Knezevic 2008, StatNews 73).

Similarly, we observe that perceptions of political commonality are activated under exposure to anti-Latino appeals. When exposed to anti-Latino appeals, Latinos with higher perceptions of shared Latino political interests are less likely to vote for Representative Wilson. Figure 2.5 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Wilson among Latinos with low versus high perceptions of shared political interests with Latinos across conditions. In the anti-Latino condition, the difference between Latinos with low versus high perceptions of shared political interests is 65% or (0.65) and is statistically significant as observed by the non-overlapping confidence intervals. When exposed to an explicit anti-immigrant appeal targeting all Latino immigrants, Latinos with higher perceptions of shared pan-ethnic political interests are only 6% likely to vote for Wilson. On the other hand, Latinos with low perceptions of shared political interests are 71% likely to vote for Wilson when exposed to the anti-Latino cue. While high political identifiers have a lower probability of voting for Wilson under exposure to anti-low skilled, anti-Mexican, and anti-border conditions, we do not find a significance difference in the means or confidence intervals.

Moreover, the pattern of results are reversed under anti-Canadian (counter-stereotypical) appeals. The differences here are not statistically significant, but suggest that politically identified Latinos have a higher probability of voting for Wilson under the anti-Canadian cue. One possibility for this result is that American identities are activated when an out-group is made salient by anti-immigrant appeals. If the message is to protect American interests from Canadian immigration, Latinos may find it within their interests to vote for Representative Wilson. However, more research is needed to uncover the role of American

identities in Latino political decision-making under exposure to anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Figure 2.5: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Latino Political Interests and by Condition



This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model 3 (Political), Table 2.7 predicting vote support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the anti-Canadian condition as the baseline with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest difference between low and high politically identified Latinos.

The last column in Table 2.7 estimates the effect of all pan-ethnic considerations on vote support across conditions using a summary measure of Latino linked fate, perceptions of economic and political commonality. While only significant at the 0.10 level, the differences in the level of voting support under anti-Latino appeals are consistent with my hypotheses. Latino group interests are only activated under exposure to anti-Latino appeals.

Moreover, we also observe that non-Mexicans' voting preferences are not a direct function of Latino group interests under exposure to anti-Mexican or anti-border political appeals

(H2). Exposure to nationality-based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants, whether explicit or implicit, did not activate Latino group interests in a decision *not* to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson. In sum, perceptions of linked fate, economic, and political interests are not salient predictors of decreased voting support for Representative Wilson under exposure to appeals directly or indirectly targeting Mexican immigrants.

To test the robustness of my findings, I consider whether other ethnic group interests are made salient by anti-immigrant appeals. The central argument of this paper is that for group-based mobilization to occur among non-Mexican Latino groups, Latinos of diverse national origin groups must perceive commonality within their economic and political experiences (Padilla 1985). The political environment determines when and how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as “Latinos” or as members of their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985). If my hypothesis is correct that pan-ethnic appeals are important in making Latino group interests salient among non-Mexican Latino groups, we should not find any evidence that these appeals activate national origin considerations. Table 2.8 illustrates the effect of national origin considerations on voting support for Representative Wilson across conditions. I do not find any evidence that perceptions of linked fate, economic, or political commonality with an individual’s national origin group are activated by anti-immigrant appeals in candidate support.

Lastly, Table 2.9 examines whether non-Mexicans rely upon partisanship in their evaluation of Representative Wilson when exposed to counter-stereotypical appeals (H3). The results for party identification in the baseline condition (anti-Canadian) are presented in the first row.²¹ While the coefficient is negative, I find that party identification is not a significant predictor of support for Wilson for those exposed to political messages about decreasing Canadian immigration. Moreover, partisanship is not a significant predictor of decreased voting support for Wilson in the presence of ethnic appeals.

²¹Party identification is recoded to a binary variable such that Democrats are coded 1 and all else 0.

Table 2.8: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson with National Origin Attitudes, by Condition

	National LF	National Economic	National Political	Sum
Identity Consideration (see column heading)	-0.27 (0.43)	-0.20 (0.41)	-0.82 (0.45)	-0.23 (0.18)
Conditions				
Anti-Latino	1.17 (1.76)	-0.84 (2.34)	-2.68 (2.19)	0.39 (3.08)
Anti-Mexican	0.35 (1.60)	0.92 (2.05)	-1.36 (1.87)	0.67 (2.43)
Anti-Low Skilled	0.92 (1.48)	-0.17 (1.89)	-3.96 (1.86)	-1.63 (2.02)
Anti-Border	-1.38 (1.71)	-1.07 (1.82)	-2.98 (1.66)	-2.48 (2.25)
Interactions				
Anti-Latino: Identity	-0.68 (0.75)	0.16 (0.78)	0.96 (0.76)	-0.06 (0.37)
Anti-Low Skilled: Identity	-0.26 (0.59)	0.17 (0.64)	1.56 (0.65)	0.25 (0.25)
Anti-Mexican: Identity	-0.12 (0.62)	-0.25 (0.74)	0.56 (0.72)	-0.05 (0.30)
Anti-Border: Identity	0.51 (0.65)	0.39 (0.65)	1.15 (0.62)	0.31 (0.28)
Controls				
Foreign-Born	-0.16 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.39)	-0.06 (0.39)	-0.07 (0.39)
Income	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Intercept	-0.21 (1.13)	-0.48 (1.23)	0.92 (1.19)	0.71 (1.42)
Number of cases	159	154	150	147

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The model “Sum” combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition.
* $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

Table 2.9: Predicting Vote Support for Wilson by Partisan Identification and by Condition

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Party (1=Democrat)	-0.32	(0.81)
Conditions		
Anti-Latino	0.03	(0.78)
Anti-Low Skilled	0.22	(0.73)
Anti-Mexican	-0.40	(0.76)
Anti-Border	-0.20	(0.77)
Interactions		
Anti-Latino: Party	-0.89	(1.24)
Anti-Low Skilled: Party	0.22	(1.07)
Anti-Mexican: Party	0.72	(1.11)
Anti-Border: Party	0.25	(1.13)
Controls		
Foreign-Born	-0.30	(0.38)
Income	0.05	(0.07)
Intercept	-0.81	(0.69)
Number of cases	162	

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper builds upon previous research by shedding new light on the political preferences of non-Mexican Latino groups in New York City. Prior research focuses on the political experiences of Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans in California, Texas, or Arizona (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Barreto and Woods 2005; Bowler, Nicholson and Segura 2006). While Mexicans have become the largest immigrant and minority group in the United States, an unresolved question in the literature on Latino politics is whether processes of collective identity formation among Mexicans are generalizable to other Latino national origin groups. The results presented in this paper suggest that *not* all anti-immigrant political messages resonate among non-Mexican Latino groups. I find that only explicit appeals in which Latinos are targeted are effective in activating Latino group interests in decreased voting support for candidates using anti-Latino political appeals.

Media attention on the politics of immigration generally focuses on the experiences of Mexican immigrants. As the largest minority group with higher levels of undocumented immigration relative to other groups, Mexicans have come to occupy a prominent position in the politics of US immigration. Given the overt and implied focus of Mexican immigrants in elite immigration discourse, I also find that both explicit and implicit nationality-based cues about Mexican immigration do not activate collective identity considerations in the voting decisions of non-Mexicans.

The experience of racialization among minority groups involves two sides to the coin: the public's view of the collective group and how groups view themselves. While some have argued that the American public's treatment and recognition of Latinos, regardless of national origin membership or generational status, is often the same, the results suggest that we remain cautious in generalizing about the presumed pan-ethnic experience in America. Latinos are aware of these differences more than so presumably than the general public. These differences are likely to affect which types of anti-immigrant messages resonate among

Mexican versus non-Mexican Latino groups (Defrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006).

The study has important implications for the future incorporation of Latinos within the American context. Political parties and candidates need to be particularly cautious about how they use the issue of immigration to mobilize the American public and its consequences on the Latino vote. Some anti-immigrant messages have the potential of mobilizing all Latinos while other political messages may segment the Latino vote. While most Latinos are less likely to support a candidate with an anti-immigrant political agenda, non-Mexicans in New York City are significantly less likely to vote for a candidate with a message targeting the collective group. We do not observe these same effects under exposure to explicit or implicit anti-immigrant political appeals targeting Mexicans. Collective groups interests are not activated in the voting decisions of non-Mexican Latino groups under exposure to direct or indirect appeals targeting Mexican immigrants.

The results also suggest how Latino activists and political elites can promote collective group interests to gain electoral advantage. The US political system rewards those groups with a strong, palpable presence and a set of well-articulated interests (Browning, Tabb, and Marshall 1994; Schmidt 2000; McAdam 1999). Thus, the extent to which elected officials and organization can elicit these pan-ethnic considerations on a national stage through common economic experiences may bring symbolic and material rewards for the political incorporation of Latinos as a cohesive group.

There are three important limitations in this study to address. First, while ambitious, this study does contain a relatively small convenience sample of non-Mexican Latino respondents. Sample size is always a concern in determining the probability of making a correct estimate. The larger one's sample, the more accurate one can be that it reflects the population of interest. This would indicate that if the sample size was larger, our confidence intervals would be small as well. The confidence intervals generated in the preceding models are large given the size of this New York City sample. However, this study relies upon a

sample of 192 non-Mexican Latino groups compared to previous experimental studies with a sample of 63 (McConnaughey, White, Leal, and Casellas 2010). More importantly, it sheds light on the causal mechanisms of voting among non-Mexican groups, which has not been fully addressed in recent research (Barreto 2007).

Second, non-Mexican subjects in the New York City are not given a cue to their own national origin group. Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Colombians, and even Ecuadorians may respond differently if their own group is targeted in an anti-immigrant appeal. Moreover, Puerto Rican and even Dominican identity is just as salient in New York City as Mexican identity in Los Angeles. While important, nationality-based appeals, in this dissertation, are defined around the interests of Mexican immigrants given their prominence in American immigration debates. Mexican immigrants are frequently targeted in national debates to curtail immigration, particularly undocumented immigration. Puerto Ricans, who are all American citizens, are less likely to be targeted in national efforts to decrease immigration. With these considerations in mind, the primary goal of this research was to determine whether explicit and implicit appeals around Mexican immigration resonate among non-Mexican Latino groups. The results presented in this article suggest that we take seriously the complexity of Latino group identity in the United States. Given this diversity, we should expect the processes by which Latino identities are activated by anti-immigrant political rhetoric to be different for non-Mexican Latino groups.

Third, the New York City experiment does not incorporate Mexican immigrants, preventing us from evaluating the effect of anti-immigrant appeals on Mexican immigrants. While Puerto Ricans and Dominicans represent the largest Latino groups in the City, Mexicans have been the fastest growing Latino group. In 1990, they numbered only 58,000 or 3.3% of the total Latino population. In 2009, they increased to nearly 320,000 or 13.5% (Latino Data Project, Report 43, 2011). If annual population growth rates are consistent over time, Mexicans will surpass both Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in 2030, becoming the City's

largest national Latino sub-group. The weakness of the data is that it solely focuses on non-Mexicans, missing these important trends.

Moreover, left unresolved is whether we can expect the same type of anti-immigrant appeals to resonate among Mexican immigrants in Border States such as California. Given the consistent “replenishment” of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the Southwest and the constant political battles at play over immigrant rights in cities such as Los Angeles, Mexican identity may be increasingly salient for Mexicans in these regions. Pan-ethnic identities as a political resource may not particularly meaningful yet if an individual’s social connections and personal networks are limited to a single national origin group at the neighborhood level. There is considerable debate as to whether this concept of pan-ethnicity links with demographic reality (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). The next stage of this research is to conduct this study in a context more nationally representative of Mexican immigrants to determine which types of political messages resonate most with Mexicans as compared to non-Mexicans.

– Essay Three –

Activating Mexican Identity: The Determinants of Vote Choice in Response to Ethnic Cues in Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric

“At the heart of Latino or Hispanic ethnic identity are the circumstantial conditions of structural or institutional inequality”

- Felix M. Padilla, *Latino Ethnic Consciousness*, 1985

Abstract

Empirical evidence from essay two suggests that among non-Mexican Latino groups only explicit, pan-ethnic appeals in which Latinos are targeted activate pan-ethnic group interests in a decision *not* to support a political candidate. Left unresolved, however, is whether political processes of collective identity formation among non-Mexicans in New York City are generalizable to Mexicans in Border States. In a laboratory experiment, I test the effects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical political appeals on the salience of identity in candidate support among Mexicans and non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. I find that *not* all anti-immigrant political messages resonate among Mexicans as they do for non-Mexicans. There are conditions upon which collective identity is activated. I find that *only* nationality-based political appeals targeting Mexicans activate Mexican group interests in decreased voting support for a political candidate. Conversely, these results do not extend to non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. Exposure to pan-ethnic and nationality-based political appeals did not activate perceptions of shared ethnicity among non-Mexicans. These findings not only suggest that identity activation in contexts of threat may work differently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans, but they also have important implications for the future incorporation of Latinos on a national political stage.

Introduction

Public discontent over illegal immigration and rapid population growth from Mexico has divided candidates and political parties in their attempts to maintain existing political coalitions and garner votes from this new emerging electorate. While some political elites have relied on more inclusive strategies to capture the Latino vote, others have relied on exclusionary political appeals at the expense of losing Latino voters. The 2010 midterm elections illustrate these trends. In Nevada, Democratic Senator Harry Reid won against Sharron Angle, the Republican contender, who in the final two weeks of the 2010 campaign targeted

Mexican immigrants in her anti-immigrant political ads. In Colorado, Republican Senator Tancredo accused Democrat John Hickenlooper of supporting “sanctuary city” policies to protect illegal immigrants (Foley 2010). In both cases, political candidates targeting Mexican immigrants lost the Latino vote by a substantial margin, resulting in their defeat.

The immediate consequence has been the awakening of what many political pundits and scholars once characterized as the “sleeping giant” of American politics. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of eligible Latino voters increased from 13.2 million in 2000 to 21.3 million in 2010 (Lopez 2011, “Pew Hispanic Center”), increasing scholarly interest in the role of political threat on Latino voting behavior (Pantoja et al. 2001; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006; Barreto and Woods 2005). Of central importance from this line of research has been the activation of shared ethnicity in predicting Latino vote choice. The empirical evidence suggests that under conditions of threat from anti-immigrant political appeals, Latinos will coalesce with other Latinos, “even among those with whom they only share the term ‘Latino’ in common,” in decisions to vote for or against political candidates (Barreto 2007).

While the experience of immigration is shared across Latino groups, Mexicans have taken a prominent role in the national debate about immigration reform. Much of this attention from academics and political pundits is attributed to undocumented immigration. As of March 2010, 11.2 unauthorized immigrants were living in the U.S. (Passel and Cohn 2011). Of this number, more than 50 percent were from Mexico (Passel 2011). These demographic trends have stigmatized Mexicans in American immigration discourse, increasing anti-immigrant appeals and legislation targeting Mexican immigrants. Such racialization has created shared political identities, which have become the basis for collective political action (Telles and Oritz 2008).

This article engages with two important research questions: one, under what conditions does exposure to anti-immigrant political appeals increase or decrease the salience of collective group interests in Latino voting decisions? Two, which types of immigrant political

messages resonate most with Mexican versus non-Mexican Latino groups? In a laboratory experiment, I test the effects of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, and counter-stereotypical political appeals on Latino candidate support. I find that *not* all anti-immigrant messages resonate among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups in Los Angeles. There are conditions upon which identity is activated. Among Mexicans, I find that *only* exposure to nationality-based appeals in which Mexicans targeted activates Mexican group interests in a decision *not* to vote for a political candidate. Among non-Mexicans, I do not find any evidence that exposure to pan-ethnic appeals increases the salience of pan-ethnic group interests in voting decisions.

This article forwards our understanding about the consequences of ethnically targeted political appeals. To do so, I take into account the fluidity and complexity of Latino group identity in the United States, grappling in a unique way with the external conditions that may foster or minimize collective mobilization among Latinos. I build upon existing research that focuses exclusively on Latinos of Mexican descent in two ways: first, I clarify expectations about the responses of non-Mexicans and Mexicans to anti-immigrant political messages. Second, I define the forms of group identity relevant to political decision-making among Mexicans and non-Mexican Latino groups residing within a Border State. These findings not only suggest that identity activation may work differently for non-Mexican Latino groups than for Mexicans in the context of immigration threat, but they also have important implications for the future incorporation of Latinos on a national political stage.

Latino Identities in Context

Padilla (1985) identifies the conditions under which national origin or pan-ethnic considerations become salient in politics. Drawing upon ethnographic research on Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago, he argues that Latino ethnic identity is a “situational ethnic identity.” Particular features of the social and political environment determine when and

how members of distinctive Spanish-speaking groups mobilize as “Latinos” or as members of their respective national origin group (Padilla 1985). Of significance is his attention to labor markets in the cultivation of “Latinismo.” In his view, the creation of Latino ethnic identity is inextricably tied to Latinos’ participation and concentration in low-wage, less technically advanced industries (Padilla 1985, 7). Panethnic mobilization is “situationally specific” and is activated under “certain circumstances of inequality experiences, shared by more than one Spanish-speaking group at a point in time” (Padilla 1985). Shared histories of economic exclusion between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in metropolitan Chicago create opportunities for the emergence of a pan-ethnic Latino identity with political salience.

Conversely, when these conditions are not met, individuals may mobilize on the basis of other salient forms of identity such as national origin. One central assumption behind Padilla’s (1985) theory is that members of at least two or more Spanish-speaking groups live and perceive shared urban experiences within a geographical space. An important question that emerges from this research is whether pan-ethnic identities are particularly meaningful if an individual’s social connections and networks are limited to a single national origin group (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). Latino populations are spatially dispersed throughout the United States. Based on Padilla’s (1985) theory, the salience of panethnicity in politics should be particularly low in contexts where there is limited interaction across Latino groups. To the extent that conditions for intergroup contact are not met, opportunities for pan-ethnic mobilization may be diminished (Padilla 1985, 164). However, Padilla (1985) does not address this relationship at length and does not empirically test whether the salience of pan-ethnic identities exist in contexts outside of Chicago. In this paper, I expand upon this research by examining whether pan-ethnic versus national origin identities are more salient among Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups and whether political messages about immigration can increase or decrease salience of these identities in political decision-making.

The Accessibility of Mexican Identity

Pan-ethnic considerations may not be particularly accessible in geographic contexts where a national origin group is sufficient in numbers to mobilize effectively on its own. California, for example, is similar to many Border States in this regard. Historically, Mexican political influence has not depended upon the activation of panethnicity. Mexicans have been incredibly strong in flexing their own political muscles without coalescing with other Latino groups given their exceptional size in Border States (Segura and Rodrigues 2006; Hero 1992). This does not suggest that other non-Mexican groups such as Guatemalans or Salvadorans are non-existent within these geographical spaces, but they have not reached a sufficient threshold to make panethnicity salient within many immigrant communities.

Ongoing immigration from Mexico has facilitated the emergence of a strong Mexican political identity. Since 1970, the foreign-born Mexican population has surpassed the number of foreign-born individuals from European countries (American Community Survey, US Census Bureau). Estimates from the 2006 American Community Survey reveal that Mexican immigrants make up nearly 31 percent, or 11.5 million, of the total U.S. foreign-born population (American Community Survey, Pew Hispanic Center). Furthermore, levels of unauthorized immigration are exceptionally high among immigrants from Mexico. Demographer Jeffrey Passel (2008) estimates that 59 percent of the foreign-born population comes from Mexico. These demographic patterns have shaped the demography of many cities. For example, Mexicans in Los Angeles constitute 79.3% of all Hispanics in the Los Angeles Metropolitan area, followed by 7.2% of Salvadorans, and 4.3% of Guatemalans (Pew Hispanic Center, 2009 American Community Center).

Los Angeles' growing Mexican immigrant population has increased the salience of Mexican ethnicity for later generation Hispanics and descendants (Jiménez 2010). Jiménez (2010) argues that "the strength of attachment that people have to an identity rooted in ethnicity depends in large part on the availability of ethnically linked resources for their construction

of that identity” (Jiménez 2010, 102). These “ethnic raw materials” include art, music, food, language, style of dress, holidays, and so forth (Alba and Nee 2003). Even when traditions are not passed from one generation to the next within a family, the presence of a large Mexican-immigrant population provides abundant opportunities and frequent interactions across generations that contribute to the construction a strong Mexican identity for later generation immigrants to share.

Shared economic disadvantages across Mexicans generations also increase the accessibility of Mexican identity. Evidence based on national statistics show that Mexican Americans have consistent low socioeconomic status beyond the second generation (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Schooling data across generations has shown that educational attainment improves from immigrant parents to their children, but remains stagnant between the second and third generations (Bean et al. 1994; Borjas 1994). Similarly, these low education rates shape income patterns. Telles and Ortiz (2008) show that personal earnings among original respondents in 1965 and 2000 were below \$30,000. Third-generation children earned an average of \$37,600 whereas fourth generation children earned only \$30,600 (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Poverty rates reflect these same demographic changes. In 1965, 25 percent of immigrants were poor. In 2000, the reported poverty rate among original respondents in Los Angeles was 34% (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Thus, Mexican identity may be more politically accessible to Mexicans than panethnicity. Ongoing immigration from Mexico coupled with shared experiences of economic exclusion across generations “replenishes” the salience of Mexican identity (Jiménez 2010).

Activating Mexican Identity in Politics

The preceding discussion illustrates how demographic patterns and shared experiences of economic exclusion within a geographic context can increase the accessibility of national origin identities. However, these identities are not “chronically accessible” in Latino polit-

ical decision-making; they can vary in use (Lau 1989). The right type of political message can make an already accessible identity even more accessible, leading an individual to give it greater weight in making decisions about candidates (Chong 1996; Lavine et al. 1996; Mendelberg 2001). News media and political campaigns about immigration can shape Latino opinions about candidates by increasing the salience of collective identities in politics. However, such immigrant rhetoric in campaigns may resonate differently among Mexicans and non-Mexicans.

Mexicans have taken a prominent role in the national debate about immigration reform. Mexico represents the largest source of immigration to the United States. These demographic trends have stigmatized Mexicans in American immigration discourse, increasing anti-immigrant appeals and legislation targeting Mexican immigrants. I consider three types of anti-immigrant political messages that are likely to promote or disrupt ethnic boundaries in Latino vote choice: pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical political appeals.

Pan-ethnic appeals use words such as “Latino” or “Hispanic” to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the collective group. Nationality-based appeals focus on the interests of a particular national origin group to express anti-immigrant sentiments, to make stereotypical or derogatory statements, or to portray a threat from the respective group. I focus on Mexican immigrants given their proximity to national debates about immigration. Counter-stereotypical appeals express these same sentiments, but focus on a nationality-group less frequently stigmatized in American immigration debates. I use Canadian immigrants based on their perceived status as high-skilled immigrants in elite discourse about immigration. I posit that exposure to nationality-based appeals targeting Mexicans will increase the salience of Mexican identity among Mexicans in a decision not to vote for a candidate.

Research Hypotheses

H1: Mexicans will be less likely to vote for a candidate when exposed to nationality-based appeals targeting their national origin group.

H1A: Mexicans with higher perceptions of Mexican group interests will be less likely to support a candidate under exposure to anti-immigrant political appeals targeting their national origin group.

Overview of Methods and Procedures

To examine which types of immigrant political messages resonate among Mexicans, I designed an experiment to observe how potential voters make political decisions under conditions of threat. I find the experimental approach useful in its ability not only to hold constant confounding factors that threaten the validity of causal inference in observational studies of voting behavior, but also in its ability to use a battery of survey questions to isolate the mechanism behind Latino vote choice.

I embed a mock audio news clip from National Public Radio (NPR) with a web-based survey. Upon arriving for the study, participants are asked whether they prefer to complete the survey in Spanish or English. I rely upon a post-test only design to avoid contamination of the treatment by pre-test measurement (McConnaughey, White, Leal, and Casellas 2010). The primary goal is to avoid questions that may prime identity before the experimental cue is given. Thus, all measures except for basic demographic questions are asked after subjects are exposed to the treatment.

In article two, non-Mexican Latino respondents were randomized into one of three conditions to test the effect of pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical appeals on candidate support in New York City. This paper replicates the New York City experiment, with an addition of a control, using a larger sample of Mexicans and non-Mexicans in Los Angeles, California. In sum, these experiments allow us to evaluate several unresolved issues

in the literature on Latino political behavior: first, they illustrate the causal mechanisms behind vote support by specifying the types of political messages that activate collective forms of identity between Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. Second, they clarify which forms of collective identity become most salient to non-Mexicans and Mexican groups in their decisions not to support a political candidate in contexts of immigration threat.

The experimental conditions emphasize the negative consequences of increased levels of immigration. The audio clip begins with a mock news reporter from NPR describing two congressional representatives running for office in California, Representative Nicholas Wilson and Chris Peterson, who differ on the issue of immigration reform. Without reference to either candidate's political party affiliation, the reporter focuses exclusively on Representative Wilson's position about the potential costs of increased immigration in California. What changes across conditions is the group discussed by the congressional representative. The candidate's position on immigration varies in the degree to which he targets Latinos collectively as a group (pan-immigrant appeal), Mexican immigrants (nationality-based appeal), or Canadian immigrants (counter-stereotypical appeal). The control condition focuses on Representative Wilson's position against clean energy control standards in California. In general, he calls for the removal of all caps on greenhouse gas emissions. After being randomly assigned to one of four conditions, subjects answer an extensive battery of post-test questions, which include questions about their intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson, identity considerations, and political attitudes. On completion of the post-test questionnaire subjects are debriefed and paid.

This experiment is carried out in computer labs at East Los Angeles Community College and three community adult schools providing ESL and citizenship classes in Southern California: Jefferson High Community Adult School, Evans Community Adult School, and South Gate Community Adult School between June 16 and July 11, 2011. A total of 401 Latinos participated in the experiment, of which 282 are Mexican and 119 are non-Mexican

groups. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the number of participants in each condition.

Table 3.1: Experimental Conditions and Sample Size

		All Latinos	Mexicans	Non-Mexicans
Pan-ethnic	Anti-Latino	100	74	26
Nationality-Based	Anti-Mexican	98	66	32
Counter-Stereotypical	Anti-Canadian	102	72	30
Control	Anti-Clean Energy	101	70	31
Total		401	282	119

Los Angeles Demographics

Table 3.2 provides a snapshot of the demographics of all Latino participants, Mexicans, and non-Mexicans separately in the Los Angeles experiment. In contrast to New York City, the Los Angeles sample is nationally representative of U.S. Latinos in terms of national origin (see table 4). About 65% of all U.S. Latinos are of Mexican descent. In the Los Angeles experiment, 70% of all participants are Mexican, followed by Salvadorans and Guatemalans. The median age of all participants is 22 years old. About 32% of all participants have graduated from high school and the median family income ranges between \$15,000 and \$24,000, significantly lower than the national average for U.S. Latinos (\$40,000). Moreover, 46 percent are considered first generation, 45% are second generation, and 9% are third generation immigrants. More than half of the Los Angeles participants are American citizens (62%). Politically, the Los Angeles sample is significantly more liberal than the U.S. average for Latinos. Among all U.S. Latinos, 13.1% classify themselves ideologically as liberal and 30% identify with the Democratic Party. In this sample, 30% of participants characterized themselves as liberal and 49% identify as Democrats.

We also observe slight differences between Mexican and non-Mexican participants in the experiment. The non-Mexican participants are slightly older; the median age is 25 years

Table 3.2: Demographics of Participants in Los Angeles

	All	Mexicans	Non-Mexicans
Age (Median)	22	21	25
Education(High School)	32%	35%	27%
Education (Some College)	34%	37%	29%
Family Income	\$15,000 - \$24,999	\$15,000 - \$24,999	\$15,000 - \$24,999
Gender (Female)	47%	48%	46%
First Generation	46%	38%	65%
Second Generation	46%	51%	30%
Third Generation	9%	10%	5%
US Citizenship	64%	69%	53%
Survey Language (English)	62%	69%	47%
Liberal	30%	34%	20%
Democrat	49%	54%	52%
Mexican	70%		
Salvadoran	11%		
Guatemalan	7%		
Honduran	2%		
Total	401	282	119

Entries do not add up to 100% for national origin groups since I am only presenting the top national origin groups represented in the study.

compared to 21 years among Mexican participants. Moreover, about half of Mexican participants are second generation immigrants whereas 65% of non-Mexican participants are first generation. However, in terms of education, gender, income, and partisanship, the characteristics of Mexicans and non-Mexicans are relatively similar. The median income for Mexican and non-Mexican participants is between \$15,000 and \$24,999. About 46% of Mexican and 48% of non-Mexican respondents are female. Politically, 54% of Mexican and 52% of non-Mexican participants identify with the Democratic Party, suggesting few differences between the two samples of participants.

This sample is representative of US Latinos on some demographic measures versus others (see Table 3.3). The median age for US Latinos is 27 years old.(2009 American Community Survey, U.S. Census). Approximately 24 percent of US Hispanics have graduated from high school. The median family income of all US Latinos is 40,000. My sample in Los Angeles has lower median family incomes, ranging from 15,000 to 24,000. Mexicans are the largest Hispanic origin group in the United States, representing almost 65% of all Latinos (2009 American Community Survey, U.S. Census). Mexicans comprise 70% of my Los Angeles sample. The 2006 Latino National Survey indicates that 13.1% of Latinos consider themselves liberal and 34% identify politically as Democrat. There are significant differences in US citizenship between my sample and US Latinos. Only 43.7% of all Latinos are U.S. citizens. My sample contains an average of 64% of Latinos who are American citizens.

Measuring Exposure

Among all participants, 90 percent correctly identified Representative Nicholas Wilson's name in the news report. Moreover, 90 percent of participants randomized into an anti-immigrant condition indicated the central topic discussed was about immigration. Respondents were also asked to recall the group mentioned in the news clip. In the anti-Latino condition, 73 percent of all respondents indicated that Latino immigrants were mentioned in

Table 3.3: Demographics of US Latinos

	US Latinos
Age	27
Education (Completed High School)	23.7%
Family Income (Median)	\$40,000
Mexican	65%
Puerto Rican	9.1%
Salvadoran	3.6%
Cuban	3.5%
Dominican	2.8%
Guatemalan	2.2%
Colombian	1.9%
Honduran	1.3%
Ecuadorian	1.3%
Peruvian	1.2%
Liberal	13.1%
Democrat	34%
US Citizenship	43.7%

Source: American Community Survey, 2009, Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of 2000 Census (5% IPUMS) and 2009 American Community Survey (1% PUMS), 2010 Census Summary File 1, 2006 Latino National Survey

the news clip. The percentage of respondents is slightly lower in the anti-Mexican condition, with 67 percent recalling the correct group mentioned. In the anti-Canadian condition, 71 percent of Latinos correctly identified Canadian immigrants as the group targeted in the news clip. Finally, 69 percent of respondents in the control condition accurately recalled that there was no specific group mentioned.

Immigrant Political Rhetoric and Mexican Vote Choice

The first test to evaluate is whether Mexicans will be less likely to vote for Representative Wilson when exposed to nationality-based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants. I simply calculate the percentage of Mexican subjects who intend to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson across experimental conditions. Only 25% of Mexican respondents in the

anti-Mexican condition indicate they will vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson compared to 36% in the anti-Latino and 37% in the anti-Canadian conditions. In the control condition, where subjects listened to a news clip about Representative Wilson’s opposition to clean energy standards, 62% of respondents indicate they will vote for Representative Wilson.

I also model subjects’ intentions to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson as a function of each treatment with those exposed to the control condition as the excluded category. Table 3.4 displays these results. I find that all anti-immigrant appeals are statistically different from the control. Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted probability of voting for Representative Nicholas Wilson across each condition. Subjects in the anti-Mexican condition have a 26% probability of voting for Representative Wilson whereas those in the anti-Latino and anti-Canadian condition are 36% likely to vote for Wilson. While the directions and magnitudes of the resultant differences in the level of support for Representative Wilson are consistent with my hypothesis (H1), the differences across anti-immigrant appeals are not statistically different from each other.

Table 3.4: Predicting Vote Support among Mexicans, by Condition


	Coefficient	Standard Error
Anti-Mexican	-1.60 ***	(0.38)
Anti-Latino	-1.03 **	(0.25)
Anti-Canadian	-1.09 **	(0.25)
Intercept	0.50 *	(0.25)
N	276	

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

Moreover, we observe a significant difference between the anti-immigrant appeals and the control. In the control condition, Representative Wilson promotes the erosion of clean energy

standards to protect American workers and families in California. Here, Representative Wilson links the economic recession with rising costs associated with maintaining clean energy control costs. To protect American families, Wilson urges the removal of these standards. Given Wilson’s platform, economic interests might be highly salient in Mexican decisions to vote for Representative Wilson. These framing effects might account for these significant difference between anti-immigrant political appeals and the control. ²²

Figure 3.1: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson among Mexicans by Condition



This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 3.4 predicting vote support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the control condition as the baseline. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition.

²²This condition was emulated from a recent clean energy bill in California in 2010.

Activating Mexican Ethnicity

Next, I examine the degree to which Mexicans made their vote choice based on collective group interests. I expect nationality-based political appeals, those implicating Mexican immigrants in debates to decrease immigration, to increase the salience of Mexican group interests in a decision not to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson (H1A). I estimate a model of intended vote choice for Representative Wilson - where 0 indicates intent not to vote for Representative Wilson and 1 indicates intent to vote for him - as a function of collective group interests. Voting for Representative Wilson is regressed upon each ethnic attitude, condition (with the control as the excluded category), and interactions are included between each ethnic attitude and condition. To measure ethnic attitudes, I rely upon perceptions of linked fate, shared economic, and political commonality with Mexicans (national origin group) and Latinos/Hispanics (Pan-ethnic group). For each dimension of ethnic identity - national origin or pan-ethnic - I also create a summary measure of linked fate, economic, and political interests. To guard against the possibility that differences in the distribution of socio-demographic variables across cells might account for the differences we observe, I control for age, sex, and education (See Table F.1 in Appendix for covariates across conditions).

Table 3.5 summarizes the effect of Mexican group interests on voting for Representative Wilson. The results generally conform to expectations. The coefficient on the interaction between the anti-Mexican condition and shared Mexican economic interests is significant and negative. Mexicans with higher perceptions of shared economic interests are significantly less likely to vote for Representative Wilson when exposed to anti-immigrant cues implicating their own national origin group.

To aid interpretation of this effect, I compare the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson between low and high economically identified Mexicans across conditions in Figure 3.2. The difference between low and high Mexican economic identifiers in voting


Table 3.5: Predicting Mexicans' Voting Support for Representative Wilson by Mexican Identity and by Condition

	Mexican LF	Mexican Economic	Mexican Political	Summary
Identity Consideration (see column heading)	0.35 (0.31)	0.20 (0.37)	-0.13 (0.36)	0.12 (0.17)
Conditions				
Anti-Latino	0.29 (1.19)	0.37 (1.49)	-1.71 (1.27)	0.39 (1.79)
Anti-Mexican	-0.31 (1.26)	1.89 (1.61)	-1.43 (1.29)	1.15 (1.85)
Anti-Canadian	-0.46 (1.21)	0.81 (1.60)	-2.67 (1.35)	-0.52 (1.89)
Interactions				
Anti-Latino: Identity	-0.53 (0.41)	-0.52 (0.51)	0.21 (0.45)	-0.18 (0.21)
Anti-Mexican: Identity	-0.51 (0.44)	-1.26 * (0.57)	-0.12 (0.48)	-0.35 (0.22)
Anti-Canadian: Identity	-0.26 (0.41)	-0.67 (0.53)	0.59 (0.48)	-0.07 (0.22)
Controls				
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Female	0.17 (0.28)	0.35 (0.29)	0.16 (0.29)	0.20 (0.29)
Education	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)
Intercept	-0.24 (1.07)	-0.12 (1.29)	0.90 (1.24)	-0.58 (1.58)
Number of cases	254	251	250	249

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The model “summary” that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the control condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

for Representative Wilson within the anti-Mexican condition is 57 percent. Mexicans with high perceptions of shared economic interests with other Mexicans are significantly less likely to vote for Representative Wilson than those who perceive they have nothing in common economically with other Mexicans when exposed to a message about decreasing Mexican immigration. For example, Mexicans with higher perceptions of economic commonality with other Mexicans have a 7 percent likelihood of voting for Wilson in the anti-Mexican condition whereas those who perceive they share nothing in common with other Mexicans economically have a 67 percent chance of voting for Representative Wilson.

Figure 3.2: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson, by Mexican Economic Interests and by Condition



Here I plot the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson between Mexicans with low and high perceptions of shared economic interest with Mexicans with 95% confidence intervals. The graph is produced using simulation estimates reported in model two of Table 3.5. Each message style is included as a dummy variable (coded 0 or 1), with the control condition as the contrast group.

I posit that pan-ethnic identities may not be salient in geographic contexts where there is limited interaction across different national origin groups and where the group is sufficient in numbers to mobilize effectively on its own. Pan-ethnic identities are not politically meaningful if an individual's social connections and networks are limited to a single national origin group (Segura and Rodrigues 2006). In the preceding analysis, I find that Mexican group interests are activated by nationality-based appeals targeting Mexicans. If my hypothesis is correct, I should not find evidence that pan-ethnic considerations are activated among Mexicans in Los Angeles. In this section, I investigate whether anti-immigrant appeals increase or decrease the salience of pan-ethnic group interests in Mexican's vote choice.

Table 3.6 illustrates the effect of pan-ethnic considerations on voting support for Representative Wilson across conditions. Again, I consider the role of Latino linked fate, Latino economic commonality, and Latino political commonality as measures of Latino group interests. With each measure and summary of Latino group interests, I do not find any evidence that pan-ethnic group considerations are activated among Mexicans by anti-immigrant appeals in a decision not to vote for Representative Wilson.

Activating Shared Ethnicity among Non-Mexicans?

Are the responses of Mexicans to immigrant political rhetoric generalizable to non-Mexicans in Los Angeles? Will non-Mexicans respond in similar ways to non-Mexicans in New York City? In Article Two, I found that only explicit, pan-ethnic appeals activate Latino group interests in a decision not to vote for Wilson. In this section, I consider the role of anti-immigrant appeals in mobilizing collective group interests in the voting decisions of non-Mexicans.

To estimate the effects of anti-immigrant appeals in shaping candidate support, I model

Table 3.6: Predicting Mexicans’ Voting Support for Representative Wilson by “Latino” Identity and by Condition

	Latino LF	Latino Economic	Latino Political	Summary
Identity Consideration (see column heading)	-0.16 (0.38)	-0.19 (0.36)	-0.08 (0.34)	-0.09 (0.15)
Conditions				
Anti-Latino	-1.34 (1.42)	-0.51 (1.42)	-1.37 (1.26)	-1.26 (1.67)
Anti-Mexican	-1.69 (1.44)	-0.67 (1.55)	-1.17 (1.30)	-0.93 (1.83)
Anti-Canadian	-2.18 (1.43)	-1.36 (1.49)	-2.31 (1.33)	-3.19 (1.80)
Interactions				
Anti-Latino: Identity	0.07 (0.49)	-0.25 (0.48)	0.07 (0.44)	0.01 (0.19)
Anti-Mexican: Identity	-0.01 (0.50)	-0.37 (0.53)	-0.19 (0.49)	-0.10 (0.22)
Anti-Canadian: Identity	0.36 (0.48)	0.05 (0.49)	0.34 (0.47)	0.22 (0.20)
Controls				
Age	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Female	0.15 (0.28)	0.35 (0.28)	0.24 (0.28)	0.17 (0.29)
Education	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.10)
Intercept	1.31 (1.30)	1.13 (1.26)	0.83 (1.16)	1.67 (1.48)
Number of cases	251	245	247	239

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The model “summary” that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the control condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

non-Mexicans' decisions to vote for Representative Wilson as a function of each treatment with those in the control as the excluded category. Table 3.7 illustrates the logit coefficients and standard errors for this test. The coefficient for the anti-Latino condition is significant and negative, suggesting that exposure to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals (anti-Latino condition) significantly decreased voting support for Representative Wilson among non-Mexicans.

Table 3.7: Predicting Vote Support among Non-Mexicans, by Condition


	Coefficient	Standard Error
Anti-Latino	-1.30 *	(0.57)
Anti-Mexican	-0.87	(0.52)
Anti-Canadian	-0.78	(0.54)
Intercept	0.49	(0.38)
N	115	

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the anti-Canadian condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

I estimate the magnitude of these effects in Figure 3.3. Here, I illustrate the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson across each condition. There is a significant difference of 30 percent in the means between the anti-Latino condition and the control. There is not a significant difference in the probability of voting for Wilson across the anti-Latino, anti-Mexican, and anti-Canadian conditions. The findings are consistent with the pattern of results we observed in essay two among non-Mexicans in New York City. While these differences are not significant, we do observe less voting support for Wilson in the anti-Latino condition. Non-Mexicans exposed to a message implicating the collective group have a 30% likelihood of voting for Wilson whereas in the anti-Mexican condition the probability is 40%, a 9 percent difference.

I now consider whether exposure to pan-ethnic appeals activate Latino group interests in candidate support among non-Mexicans. I model non-Mexicans' intentions to vote for Representative Wilson as a function of pan-ethnic group interests, conditions (with the control as the excluded category), and interactions between the condition and pan-ethnic identities. I also control for age, sex, and gender to guard against the possibility that differences in the distribution of socio-demographic variables across cells might account for the differences we observe (See Table F.2 in Appendix for covariates across conditions).

Figure 3.3: Probability of Voting for Representative Wilson among Non-Mexicans by Condition




This graph is produced from simulation estimates in Table 3.7 predicting vote support for Representative Wilson as a function of each condition with those exposed to the control condition as the baseline. The graph is scaled from lowest to highest support by condition.

Results of the logit coefficients are presented in Table 3.8. The predictions are unidirectional such that ethnic cues in anti-immigrant appeals should make panethnic group

interests a significant predictor of decreased support for Representative Nicholas Wilson. I do not find any support that pan-ethnic, nationality-based, or counter-stereotypical appeals activate Latino group interests in the voting decisions of non-Mexicans in Los Angeles. Perceptions of Latino ethnicity have no effect on support for Representative Wilson among non-Mexicans who were exposed to immigrant or non-immigrant (Clean Energy) political appeals.

Figure 3.4 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of voting for Representative Wilson between low and high politically identified non-Mexicans across conditions. The difference between low and high “Latino” political identifiers in voting for Representative Wilson within the anti-Latino is 10 percent and insignificant. We also do not observe any significant difference across other anti-immigrant conditions in priming Latino political interests in a decision not to support Wilson.

Figure 3.4: Change in Voting for Representative Wilson Between Low and High Latino Political Identifiers by Condition



This graph is produced from simulation estimates in model three (Latino Political) of Table 3.8

Table 3.8: Predicting Non-Mexicans' Voting Support for Representative Wilson by "Latino" Identity and by Condition

	Latino LF	Latino Economic	Latino Political	Summary
Identity Consideration (see column heading)	0.31 (0.45)	0.59 (0.56)	0.14 (0.54)	0.14 (0.23)
Conditions				
Anti-Latino	0.14 (1.76)	-0.28 (2.40)	-0.47 (2.04)	-0.48 (2.77)
Anti-Mexican	-0.52 (2.16)	-2.06 (2.51)	-3.25 (2.26)	-2.74 (2.93)
Anti-Canadian	-0.68 (1.94)	0.83 (2.24)	-0.18 (2.03)	0.62 (2.69)
Interactions				
Anti-Latino: Identity	-0.61 (0.61)	-0.52 (0.78)	-0.32 (0.70)	-0.14 (0.31)
Anti-Mexican: Identity	-0.10 (0.69)	0.49 (0.80)	0.97 (0.76)	0.26 (0.32)
Anti-Canadian: Identity	-0.03 (0.65)	-0.49 (0.76)	-0.13 (0.72)	-0.13 (0.32)
Controls				
Age	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Female	-0.71 (0.47)	-0.85 . (0.49)	-0.76 (0.47)	-0.90 . (0.49)
Family Income	0.17 (0.12)	0.28 * (0.14)	0.19 (0.12)	0.30 * (0.14)
Intercept	-1.16 (1.66)	-2.18 (1.91)	-0.52 (1.75)	-1.70 (2.28)
Number of cases	95	91	94	89

Note: Entries are logit coefficients. The dependent variable is a binary item, with 1 indicating intentions to vote for Representative Wilson. The impact of each identity consideration is estimated separately. The model "summary" that combines all three ethnic considerations: linked fate, economic, and political commonality. The baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of each identity consideration in the control condition. * $p < 0.05$, . $p < .10$. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

Discussion

As the largest minority group with higher levels of undocumented immigration relative to other Latino national origin groups in the country, Mexicans have come to occupy a racialized position in American immigration debates. In policies concerning border control or educational access for undocumented youth (Dream Act), Mexicans are often stigmatized. This experience of racialization creates shared political identities, which often serve as the basis for collective political action (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Many scholars posit that the stigma of being Mexican is often pinned onto other persons from Latin America. While such processes of categorization may occur in the “American mind,” there is an unresolved question as to whether non-Mexican groups perceive their fates linked with Mexicans in the context of immigration threat.

This research agenda sheds explanatory light on this question. Several major findings emerge from this study. First, anti-immigrant political messages resonate differently for Mexican and non-Mexican Latino groups. Second, there are conditions upon which national origin versus pan-ethnic identities are activated. Among Mexicans, I find that nationality-based appeals targeting Mexican immigrants increase the salience of Mexican group interests in decisions not to support a political candidate. Conversely, I do not find any evidence that pan-ethnic or nationality-based appeals targeting Latinos or Mexicans, respectively, activate Latino group interests in political decision-making among non-Mexicans.

Panethnic considerations are less accessible in Los Angeles. Historically, Mexican political influence has not depended upon the cultivation of panethnicity. Given their exceptional size relative to other Latino national origin groups, Mexicans have been incredibly strong in flexing their own political muscles. Rapid yet ongoing immigration from Mexico increases the accessibility of Mexican identity in Los Angeles. However, largely overlooked is whether non-Mexican Latino groups such as Guatemalans and Salvadorans are included within this paradigm. Jiménez (2010) does not elaborate at length about the experiences

of non-Mexicans in a city experiencing on-going Mexican immigration. My results suggest that political messages about immigration, whether defined collectively or around Mexican interests, do not resonate among non-Mexicans as they do for Mexicans in Los Angeles. More research is needed to uncover when panethnicity becomes salient for non-Mexicans at different thresholds of demographic strength across geographic contexts.

The results also show that the expression of Mexican identity is rooted in shared experiences of economic disadvantage. Mexican Americans with higher perceptions of shared economic interests with other Mexicans are less likely to vote for Representative Nicholas Wilson when exposed to an immigrant political message about decreasing Mexican immigration. Evidence based on national statistics from the U.S. Census show that these perceptions reflect patterns of “real” economic disadvantage. Mexican Americans, like other Latino national origin groups, have persistently low socioeconomic status even by third generation (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Models of European assimilation suggest that the children of immigrants made impressive gains over their parents in education, income, and occupation. We do not observe these patterns for Mexican Americans. Mexicans have experienced disadvantage on major indices of education, income, and poverty relative to other major racial and ethnic groups since the 1970s (Telles and Ortiz 2008).

Conclusion

These results have implications on the future incorporation of Latinos on a national political stage. I find that some anti-immigrant political messages resonate most with Mexicans than non-Mexicans. Given increased media attention linking Mexican immigrants to debates about immigration, Latino candidates and activists should not assume that issues of immigration are sufficient to mobilize all segments of the Latino population. For group-based mobilization to occur on a national political stage, leaders need to be strategic about how they connect experiences of non-Mexicans and Mexicans on policies related to immigration.

Latino leaders will be most successful building coalitions across different national origin groups through political messages emphasizing shared experiences of economic exclusion. Mexican individuals with higher perceptions of shared economic interests with Mexicans are significantly less likely to support a candidate promoting an anti-immigrant political agenda. These perceptions are situated in the economic realities of Latino lives throughout the United States. Mexican Americans, like Puerto Ricans and other national origin groups, have persistently low socio-economic status beyond the second and third generation. Given that the U.S. political system rewards those groups with a strong, palpable presence and a set of well-articulated interests, the extent to which elected officials and organizations can elicit shared economic interests on a national stage is likely to bring symbolic and material rewards to the political incorporation of Mexicans.

—Conclusion—

Electoral Strategy, the Immigration Debate, and Latino Politics in the 21st Century

“We really look like Republicans on paper, but they dont want usThe Democrats dont look like us on paper, but they really want us”

- Rev. Samuel Rodriguez, President of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference, *Scherer, Time Magazine*, 2012

On April 23, 2010, Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona signed the harshest law in US immigration history, SB 1070. The new law aims to identify, prosecute, and deport illegal immigrants. While some countries, including France have already mandated such laws, Arizona is the first state to demand that immigrants carry identity documents legitimizing their presence on American soil (Archibold, New York Times, April 23, 2010). The enactment of SB 1070 sparked a flurry of protests across Arizona and nationwide. From coast to coast in several cities, Hispanics rallied against the law calling it a recipe for racial and ethnic profiling.

While the passage of SB 1070 has mobilized thousands of Latinos to protest, the debate over immigration has created conflict within political parties and the American public on how best to curtail illegal immigration. Governor Brewer and several other elected leaders have come under intense political pressure by constituents enraged by the killing of a White rancher in southern Arizona by a suspected smuggler weeks before the State legislature voted on the bill. Governor Brewer invoked such stories of this ranchers death as she urged the federal government to post National Guard troops at the border.

The debate over immigration highlights two contentious dynamics in American politics an increasing Latino population and public discontent over illegal immigration. These two dynamics have divided candidates and political parties in their attempts to maintain existing political coalitions and garner votes from new emerging demographic groups. While many speculate that the immigration issue mobilizes Hispanics to the polls, immigration reform

also has consequences on the mobilization of Anglo voters. These trends have often resulted in divergent political strategies from elites, exclusionary and inclusive, explicit and implicit, on issues of immigration reform, leading many academics and political pundits to define Latinos as Americas top swing voters (Scherer, *Time Magazine*, 2012).

Since 1992, Republicans have won, on average, 30 percent, of the Latino vote, while Democrats have won, at minimum, at least 53 percent between 1992 and 2008 (Lopez 2008, Pew Hispanic Center; Passell, Fry, and Suro 2005; Abrajano, Alvarez, Nagler 2008). Cuban Americans in Florida mainly account for the proportion of Latinos within the Republican Party. Many scholars and journalists contend that the remaining 25% of the Latino vote is up for grabs, a trend that has not gone unnoticed by both political parties (Scherer, *Times Magazine*, 2012; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006). While the number of Spanish-speaking political advertisements aired in battleground media markets has increased in the past decade (DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006), substantive political incorporation has not been achieved for Latinos. In fact, on the issue of immigration, both political parties have been divided on how best to appease the anti-immigration wings of the party while capturing the Latino vote.

During the 2008 campaign, President Obama emphasized how Comprehensive Immigration Reform will be one of his main priorities during the first year of his administration (Vega 2012). However, the Obama administration pushed for health care reform and global-warming bills. During these past 4 years, he has also presided in a time of dramatic increases in deportations. In response to critics over this issue, Obama commented he could not use executive orders to suspend deportations citing that it “would not conform with [his] appropriate role as president” (Obama speech, town hall meeting organized by Univision TV network, 2011). The statement has been received with anger and frustration by many Latinos who voted heavily for Obama in 2008 (67%).

The Republican Party has mainly been on the offensive in the immigration debate, em-

ploying a number of anti-immigrant appeals, both direct and indirect, attacking Latino and/or Mexican immigrants. The 2012 Republican primary is the most recent of these larger, historical trends. In October 2011, Herman Cain drew loud cheers from crowds at two rallies in Tennessee calling for an electrified fence along the Mexican border. Speaking to a rally sponsored by the Roane County Tea Party, he explains the details of his plan:

“Its going to be 20 feet high. Its going to have barbed wire on the top. Its going to be electrified. And theres going to be a sign on the other side saying, It will kill you Warning [...] written in English and in Spanish” (Wyatt, *New York Times*, October 2011).

Contender Mitt Romney also won support from several states such as South Carolina for his opposition to in-state tuition breaks for the undocumented, advocating: “you put in place a magnet to draw illegals into the state, which is giving 100 thousand of tuition credit to illegals that come into this country” (*Huffington Post*, October 18, 2011).

Public opinion polls among Latinos show a decline in Republican support. In a survey for the Spanish-language network Univision, Matt Barreto found that just 20% of Latinos perceived Republicans were hostile. In January 2012, 27% of Latinos felt Republicans were hostile to Hispanics, with an additional 45% agreeing the Republicans care little about Latinos as a group. Moreover, a total of 72% contend they do not feel welcome by the Republican Party (Scherer, *Time Magazine*, 2012, quoted from Barreto 2012).

These trends in Latino have urged many Republican Party leaders to speak out against the rise in anti-immigrant political rhetoric by Republican candidates. Ed Gillespie, former Chairman of the Republican Party, speaking to a gathering of conservative Latinos, noted, “In 2020 if the Republican nominee for President gets the same percentage of the white, Hispanic, African American and Asian vote that John McCain got in 2008, a Democrat will be elected to the White House by 14 percentage points (Scherer, *Time Magazine*, 2012).” Other leaders such as former governor Jeb Bush and political strategist Karl Rove have also urged the Party to opt for a more moderate tone in debates about immigration.

Understanding Latino Voters - A New Approach

The preceding discussion sheds light on two assumptions in Democrat and Republican strategies to garner Latino votes: first, many conceive of Latinos as a monolithic group without any consideration of group heterogeneity. Second, there is a belief that immigration creates shared identities that mobilize all Latino voters as a cohesive voting bloc in American politics. These assumptions lead to two trajectories in political strategy for Democrats and Republicans. For Democrats the key to winning the Latino vote is for Obama to explicitly support and implement Comprehensive Immigration Reform. For Republicans the ideal strategy is to appeal to conservative Latino voters on other salient issues such as abortion or gay rights while pursuing a more moderate tone on immigration (Scherer, May 9, 2012).

While these political strategies are important in the short-term, the results from the essays in this dissertation suggests a more nuanced approach that takes into account the fluidity and complexity of Latino identity in America. Latinos share a common language, heritage, culture, and immigration experience. At different political moments such as a “Latino on the ballot,” these shared characteristics serve as an important heuristic in making shared ethnicity salient to Latino voters (Barreto 2007; McConaughy, White, Casellas, and Leal 2010). However, the findings from this compilation of essays raise an important cautionary note about the salience of identity across different national origin groups in response to anti-immigrant political rhetoric. “Latino” identity is not only contextual, but is also socially constructed (Bedolla 2005). The category Latino can have very different meanings in one context versus another and can be expressed differently in politics depending upon an individual’s national origin and geography.

The survey evidence from essay one suggests that Mexicans do not express strong attachments to the pan-ethnic identifier Latino whereas non-Mexican groups such as Dominicans and Salvadorans have a stronger tendency to express such attachments. The experimental evidence from essays two and three illustrate differences between non-Mexican Latino groups

and Mexicans in the political expression of identity in the context of threat. Among non-Mexicans in New York City, we observe that pan-ethnic appeals in which Latinos are targeted activate Latino identity in a decision not to support a political candidate. Conversely, among Mexicans in Los Angeles, we find that pan-ethnic appeals do not activate Latino identity. Nationality-based appeals in which Mexicans are attacked increase the salience of Mexican group interests in decreased candidate support.

The results illustrate the conditions under which pan-ethnic and national origin considerations become salient in politics. Pan-ethnic identities may become more accessible in cities where Latinos from multiple national origin groups live in close proximity and share common political experiences. New York City may be exceptional in this regard relative to other Southwestern cities. Its immigrant population is diverse. Unlike Los Angeles where Mexicans dominate, no one group dominates the flow of immigrants (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008). While Puerto Ricans constitute 32.9% of New York City's Hispanic population, their numbers have declined in the past decade. Dominicans, Mexicans, Ecuadorians, and Colombians have transformed the urban landscape. In 2009, Puerto Ricans represented 32.9%, Dominicans 24.9%, Mexicans 13.5%, Ecuadorians 8.9%, and Colombians 4.9% of all New York City Latinos, creating various opportunities for intergroup contact (Latino Data Project, Report 43, 2011).

Given that no one group dominates the political arena, non-Mexican groups in this particular context may find pan-ethnic identity meaningful to mobilize upon in the achievement of political power. This does not suggest that Spanish-speaking groups do not pursue courses of action in the interests of their individual national origin groups as Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, or others. I posit that the political context plays an important role in the activation of shared Latino ethnicity in political decision-making. For group-mobilization to occur in among non-Mexicans in New York City, Latinos must perceive what Wendy Brown defines as “shared injury” (Brown 1995, 27-28). In contexts where

Latinos were exposed to pan-ethnic anti-immigrant appeals, non-Mexicans with stronger perceptions of shared political linked fate were less likely to support the candidate. That sense of “shared attacked” or “shared injury” motivated them to act on behalf of the collective group.

However, pan-ethnic considerations may not be accessible in geographic contexts where a national origin group is sufficient in numbers to mobilize effectively on its own. Historically, Mexican political influence has not depended upon the activation of pan-ethnicity. Mexicans have been incredibly strong in flexing their own political muscles without coalescing with other Latino groups given their exceptional size due to high fertility and immigration rates (Hero 1992; Segura and Rodrigues 2006; Jiménez 2010). Again, this does not suggest that other groups in Los Angeles such as Guatemalans and Salvadorans are politically non-existent within these geographic spaces, but they have not reached a sufficient threshold to make pan-ethnically politically meaningful or salient in Los Angeles.

Thus, to understand how a particular message resonates among Latinos or whether it mobilizes or demobilizes collective identity in Latino political decision-making requires a consideration of national origin membership and local context. The ways in identity is activated by anti-immigrant political messages may differ for a 65 year-old Puerto Rican residing in New York City than a recently naturalized Mexican in Los Angeles. The Democratic Party has started to take account of these differences to mobilize Latino voters in Florida and the Southwest in recent campaign ads. Last year, in promoting President Obama’s jobs plan, they hired two actors in Spanish-language TV ads: a South American to read the script in Florida and a Mexican for Nevada and Colorado (Scherer, *Time Magazine*, 2012).

New Directions in Research

We also need to disentangle effects of campaign political messages across generations. The findings in essay one provides suggestive evidence that varying levels of acculturation

can play an important role in how Latinos identify. While modest, there is a strong relationship between English proficiency and American identification. While not explored in the experiments of this dissertation given sample size concerns, future research needs to investigate the effect of political messages, anti-and-pro-immigrant, across different generations. Anti-immigrant messages may resonate strongly among recent immigrants, activating shared political identities in a decision to protest or vote against a political candidate. We may find evidence of de-mobilization among later generation Hispanics, particularly among older Cuban Americans in Florida who very strongly support the Republican Party.

The findings presented also have important methodological considerations for future research on Latino identity. I have examined four measures of collective identity identification, linked fate, economic and political commonality. While this work challenges prior research that solely focuses on linked fate in extensions to Latino politics, we need better measures of identity, particularly when we examine immigrant based groups. For empirical simplicity, I asked respondents to choose the national origin in which most of their family originates. However, this approach is also hampered by selection issues since some families are not solely defined by one country of origin. Some individuals may have a parent who is of Colombian descent and another who is Puerto Rican, how does one classify him or herself in nationalistic terms? Moreover, a growing number of second generation immigrants identify by hyphenated identities, national origin and American identity. For example, Telles and Ortiz show a dramatic increase in identification as Mexican American among second generation respondents (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Instead of avoiding these complexities in group membership, future research should include measures that allow individuals to express multiple group memberships. National origin, pan-ethnic, and American identity are not fixed categories; they are the relational and may interact at times in the decision-making process.

In addition, this study highlights the need for more research on the effects of context on Latino political attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation, we observe differences in the

activation of collective identity in politics among non-Mexicans and Mexicans in New York City and Los Angeles. This study could benefit dramatically by incorporating the experiences of Puerto Ricans and Mexicans in Chicago or even more important Cubans in Florida, who express strong attachments to the Republican Party than any other Latino national origin group in the United States. This study provides initial insight that there is a strong connection in how Latino identity is understood and expressed in different contexts. To understand this trend more accurately, models of Latino political behavior need to incorporate more contextual measures in future research.

Lastly, the story of immigration politics in the United States as described in the beginning of this paper is not a story solely confined to Latinos or Mexican immigrants. In fact, political parties and candidates are caught in a dance of how best to capture the Latino vote while appeasing the anti-immigrant wings of their respective parties. If a substantial number of the party's base opposes immigration or policies that seek to incorporate undocumented immigrants, how do you appease this group while also winning the Latino vote? This dissertation discusses the intricacies of Latino identity and the implications it has on this larger question. However, a missing piece is how we understand the effect of explicit and implicit immigrant political messages on Anglo voters who comprise a substantial majority of this anti-immigrant sect of both political parties, particularly within the Republican Party.

McConnaughey, White, Leal, and Casellas (2010) have examined the effect of explicit ethnic cues on the political opinions and choices of both Latinos and Anglo. In the domain of Anglo voters, they find that explicit cues primed negative sentiments about immigrants as well as attitudes of national pride and patriotism. However, left unresolved is the distinction between pan-ethnic and nationality-based appeals or explicit and implicit ethnic appeals in shaping the considerations White Americans bring to bear in their decisions to support political candidates on issues related to immigration. Decisions to employ explicit or implicit appeals targeting Mexican immigrants might also be related to context. For ex-

ample, in states such as California or Nevada, implicit appeals might be highly effective in priming negative attitudes toward immigrants since Mexicans constitute the largest group of immigrants in these respective states. There is less of need to be explicit about the group in question since most residents know that Mexicans comprise the largest Latino group in these respective states. On the other hand, states such as Alabama might employ more explicit appeals given the relative size of Latinos within these contexts. More research is needed to uncover the effects of explicit and implicit appeals on White Americans political decision-making in immigration politics.

Overall, despite these limitations, the evidence in this dissertation is suggestive that the process by which identity is activated varies among non-Mexican Latino groups and Mexicans. The political expression of pan-ethnic and nationalistic identities is likely to differ for each group depending upon the nature and context of threat. With respect to this observation, the lessons from this dissertation are clear that we take seriously Latino heterogeneity in American politics. If we are to discern the contours of Latino political incorporation in the 21st century and beyond, we must listen to how Latinos across different national origin conceptualize their own identities. It is here that we understand the power of political messages in making these identities salient or not in American politics. For if the advancement of collective group interests is vulnerable to the political appeals in the environment, the future incorporation of Latinos as a unified group at the national level may equally vulnerable. Given the importance of collective mobilization to the promotion and advancement of minority interests in a majoritarian political system, this dissertation sheds explanatory light on the fluid and complex nature of Latino identity(ies) and its consequences to the future incorporation of Latinos in the United States.

Appendix A

Percentage of Latinos Perceiving “a lot” of Linked Fate, Economic, and Political Commonality by Generation

Table A.1: Pan-ethnic Group Attachments by Generation

	National Origin Linked Fate	Latino Linked Fate
All Latinos	50.09%	42.66%
First Generation	55.37%	48.77%
Second Generation	38.12%	29.00%
Third Generation	36.50%	25.37%
Fourth Generation	28.41%	25.81%

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Table A.2: Perceived Economic Commonality by Generation

	National Origin	Latinos
All Latinos	45.51%	38.02%
First Generation	47.60%	39.38%
Second Generation	43.88%	35.22%
Third Generation	36.52%	32.83%
Fourth Generation	29.12%	35.83%

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Table A.3: Perceived Political Commonality by Generation

	National Origin	Latinos
All Latinos	33.26%	24.32%
First Generation	33.36%	24.08%
Second Generation	34.78%	25.63%
Third Generation	31.27%	22.06%
Fourth Generation	27.62%	28.57%

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Table A.4: Of the three terms, Latino or Hispanic, national origin group, or American group, which best describes you?

	Latino/Hispanic	National Origin	American
All Latinos	37.8%	38.5%	17.1%
First Generation	40.7%	45.2%	7.6%
Second Generation	32.8%	30.2%	29.3%
Third Generation	31.7%	16.8%	46.0%
Fourth Generation	31.3%	17.0%	44.6%
Mexican	39.0%	38.9%	16.1%
Puerto Rican	27.4%	44.2%	21.7%
Cuban	26.7%	36.9%	27.6%
Dominican	39.1%	43.0%	10.2%
Salvadoran	48.2%	35.9%	9.3%

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Appendix B

Table B.1: Predicting Pan-ethnic Group Attachments by Generation

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Discriminate	-0.04	(0.06)
First Generation	0.53 *	(0.21)
Second Generation	0.35 .	(0.21)
Third Generation	0.26	(0.22)
English-Dominant	-0.67 ***	(0.08)
Time in US	0.05	(0.06)
Age	-0.01 **	(0.01)
Education	0.07 ***	(0.02)
Family Income	-0.02	(0.02)
Female	0.20 **	(0.06)
Catholic	0.33 ***	(0.07)
Mexican	-0.01	(0.08)
Dominican	0.35 *	(0.17)
Salvadoran	0.34 *	(0.17)
Cuban	-0.12	(0.16)
California	0.08	(0.09)
Intercept	11.74 ***	(0.28)
N	5886	

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Results are derived using OLS. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English proficiency, time in the US, national origin group, and California residence)

. $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix C

Dependent Variables: Policy Measures

Immigration Policies²³

Tuition: Undocumented immigrants attending college should be charged a higher tuition rate at state colleges and universities, even if they grew up and graduated high-school in the state.

Immersion: Replace multi-year bilingual instruction in schools with instruction in schools with instruction only in English after one year

Immigration Policy: What is your preferred policy on undocumented or illegal immigration?

- (1) An effort to seal off the border to stop illegal immigration
- (2) A guest worker program that permits immigrants to be in the United States
- (3) A guest worker program leading to legalization eventually
- (4) Immediate legalization of current undocumented immigrants

Non-Immigration Policies

Iraq: Keep U.S. military troops in Iraq as long as it takes to stabilize their government

Income Support: Government should provide income support to those who need it

Healthcare: The current health-care system needs government intervention to improve access and reduce costs

Vouchers: Provide school vouchers to pay for a portion of the cost to send children to private schools, even if that would take some money away from public schools

²³All immigration policies are recoded such that strong opposition to each is scored higher on a scale from 1 to 4 with 4 indicating pro-immigrant opinions.

Appendix D

Table D.1: Impact of Latino Identities on Immigrant Policies (Full Models)

	Tuition		Immersion		Immigration	
National Origin	0.06 ***	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	0.07 ***	(0.01)
Pan-ethnic	0.03 ***	(0.01)	0.03	(0.02)	0.03 **	(0.01)
American	-0.15 ***	(0.03)	-0.11 **	(0.04)	-0.12 ***	(0.03)
Foreign-Born	0.21 ***	(0.08)	-0.27 **	(0.10)	0.50 ***	(0.07)
English-Dominant	-0.39 ***	(0.08)	-0.01	(0.10)	-0.88 ***	(0.07)
Time in US	-0.06	(0.02)	0.01	(0.07)	-0.11	(0.06)
Party	-0.06 ***	(0.02)	-0.05 ***	(0.02)	0.01	(0.02)
Age	-0.01 ***	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01 ***	(0.00)
Education	0.07 ***	(0.02)	0.06 **	(0.02)	-0.05 *	(0.01)
Family Income	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.02)	-0.03 *	(0.01)
Female	0.14 **	(0.06)	0.08	(0.07)	0.20 ***	(0.05)
Catholic	0.01	(0.06)	0.07	(0.08)	0.10	(0.06)
Mexican	0.05	(0.07)	-0.01	(0.09)	0.35 ***	(0.07)
Dominican	-0.08	(0.15)	-0.07	(0.19)	0.18	(0.15)
Salvadoran	-0.09	(0.14)	-0.01	(0.19)	0.39 *	(0.15)
Cuban	-0.13	(0.14)	0.09	(0.20)	-0.05	(0.14)
California	0.06	(0.08)	-0.14	(0.10)	0.13	(0.08)
1—2	-2.10 ***	(0.27)	-1.27 ***	(0.34)	-2.52 ***	(0.26)
2—3	-1.33 ***	(0.26)	-0.04	(0.34)	-1.03 ***	(0.25)
3—4	0.03	(0.26)	1.11 ***	(0.34)	1.00 ***	(0.26)
N	5335		2611		5186	

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English proficiency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan identification (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table D.2: Impact of Latino Identities on Non-Immigrant Policies

	Iraq	Income	Health	Vouchers
Latino Identities				
National Origin	-0.02	(0.01) 0.03 *	(0.01) 0.03 **	(0.01) 0.02
Pan-ethnic	-0.01	(0.01) 0.06 **	(0.01) 0.05 **	(0.01) 0.03
American	0.21 ***	(0.03) -0.04	(0.03) 0.01	(0.03) 0.01
Acculturation				
Foreign-Born	0.01	(0.08) -0.06	(0.07) 0.03	(0.08) 0.23 *
English-Dominant	0.22 **	(0.08) -0.23**	(0.07) -0.37 **	(0.08) -1.12 ***
Time in US	-0.01	(0.05) -0.02	(0.06) 0.01	(0.06) -0.01
Time in US	-0.06	(0.02) 0.01	(0.07) 0.01	(0.06) -0.01
Party	0.10 ***	(0.02) -0.01	(0.02) -0.03	(0.02) 0.01
Age	0.01 ***	(0.01) -0.01	(0.01) 0.01	(0.01) 0.01
Education	-0.02	(0.02) -0.04	(0.02) 0.03 *	(0.02) -0.03
Family Income	0.01	(0.01) -0.15 ***	(0.01) -0.01	(0.01) -0.03
Female	-0.52 ***	(0.05) 0.02	(0.05) 0.06	(0.05) -0.07
Catholic	-0.16 *	(0.06) -0.04	(0.06) -0.01	(0.06) 0.02
Mexican	0.04	(0.07) -0.30 **	(0.07) -0.08	(0.07) -0.03
Dominican	-0.19	(0.15) -0.12	(0.15) 0.01	(0.15) 0.29
Salvadoran	0.14	(0.14) 0.01	(0.14) 0.03	(0.15) 0.26
Cuban	0.84 ***	(0.14) -0.29	(0.14) 0.05	(0.15) -0.31
Intercepts				
1—2	0.59 *	(0.25) -3.07 ***	(0.26) -2.05 ***	(0.27) -1.12 **
2—3	1.63 ***	(0.26) -2.05 ***	(0.25) -1.24 ***	(0.26) 0.09
3—4	2.61 ***	(0.26) -0.03	(0.25) 0.62 *	(0.26) 1.42 ***
N	5035	5293	5310	2560

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey.

Results are derived using ordered logit. The models control for age, education, family income, gender, Catholic religion, foreign-born status, English proficiency, time in the US, national origin group, and partisan identification (recoded as a binary variable where 1 indicates Democrat and all else 0.) See Appendix D for an illustration of the full models

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix E

Table E.1: Covariates across Conditions

	Anti-Latino	Anti-Mexican	Anti-LS	Anti-Border	Anti-Canadian
Age	20	21	21	20	20
Female	51%	51%	62%	51%	47%
Education (HS & Some College)	80%	86%	80%	84%	89%
Family Income (Median)	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>	35 – 44, 999 <i>k</i>	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>
First Generation	39%	27%	40%	46%	42%
Second Generation	55%	62%	49%	46%	55%
Third Generation	5%	11%	10%	7.7%	2.5%
Catholic	61%	59%	57%	59%	60%
Liberal	29%	30%	20%	16%	28%
Democrat	53%	46%	51%	49%	50%
% Latino in Zipcode	49%	41%	48%	44%	41%
Puerto Ricans	22%	27%	20%	23%	20%
Dominicans	50%	30%	47%	36%	40%
Ecuadorians	8.3%	13%	5%	10%	10%
Peruvians	3%	2.7%	5%	10%	2.5%
Colombians	8.3%	13%	15%	2.5%	12.5%
Salvadorans	2.8%	2.7%	2.5%	7.7%	0.00%

This table illustrates the distribution of social and demographic variables across conditions.

Appendix F

Table F.1: Covariates across Conditions among Mexicans

	Anti-Latino	Anti-Mexican	Anti-Canadian	Control
Age	21	21	20	22
Female	46%	38%	53%	56%
Education (Completed HS)	38%	46%	37%	19%
Family Income (Median)	15 – 24, 999k	15 – 24, 999k	15 – 24, 999k	15 – 24, 999k
Foreign-Born	42%	62%	36%	37%
Domestic-Born	57%	72%	63%	63%
% US Citizen	66%	66%	71%	72%
Democrat	47%	51%	48%	54%
Mexican Linkedfate	2.81	2.91	2.81	2.77
Mexican Economic	2.88	2.92	2.96	2.91
Mexican Political	2.84	2.53	2.61	2.71
Summary (Mexican)	8.52	8.36	8.34	8.41
Latino Linkedfate	2.89	2.98	2.90	2.69
Latino Economic	2.92	2.91	2.98	2.91
Latino Political	2.75	2.75	2.67	2.64
Summary (Pan-ethnic)	8.55	8.56	8.70	8.23

Here I illustrate the distribution of social and demographic variables across conditions for Mexicans

Table F.2: Covariates across Conditions among Non-Mexican Latinos

	Anti-Latino	Anti-Mexican	Anti-Canadian	Control
Age	27	28	22	24
Female	44%	33%	46%	58%
Education (Completed HS)	27%	31%	27%	22%
Family Income (Median)	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>	15 – 24, 999 <i>k</i>	15 – 24, 999 <i>k</i>	25 – 34, 999 <i>k</i>
Foreign-Born	69%	68%	56%	64%
Domestic-Born	30%	31%	43%	35%
% US Citizen	57%	39%	58%	58%
Democrat	56%	34%	53%	43%
National Linkedfate	2.62	2.34	2.50	2.79
National Economic	2.42	2.68	2.68	2.86
National Political	2.65	2.17	2.28	2.62
Summary (National)	7.74	7.28	7.58	8.18
Latino Linkedfate	2.54	2.72	2.45	3.03
Latino Economic	3.04	2.90	2.75	2.93
Latino Political	2.89	2.63	2.50	2.89
Summary (Pan-ethnic)	8.48	8.23	7.71	8.63

Here I illustrate the distribution of social and demographic variables across conditions for Non-Mexicans

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